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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF
EMINENT DOMAIN: VALUING AND
APPORTIONING CONDEMNATION
AWARDS BETWEEN LANDLORD
AND TENANT
Victor P. Goldberg,*
Thomas W. Merrill**
and Daniel Unumb***
INTRODUCTION
Who has a constitutionally protected "property" inter-
est when the government condemns land subject to a lease?
Is it the landlord? The tenant? Or do both parties have
property rights that entitle them to compensation? Further,
how should the size of the total condemnation award be de-
termined? Should we value the property rights of the land-
lord and the tenant separately and sum? Or should we value
the entire parcel as if it were an undivided fee simple and
apportion the award between the landlord and the tenant?
If the condemnation award is based on the value of a fee
simple and apportioned, who should make this division? Is
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hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950
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this an issue of consitutional law as to which the courts have
the final say? Or do the principles of constitutional law
enunciated by the courts merely provide "default rules," i.e.,
rules that apply only if the parties fail to address the issue of
compensation in the lease?
In this article, we offer a normative framework for an-
swering these questions. Our approach evolved by working
backwards. We started with the question of how to appor-
tion condemnation awards between landlord and tenant.
Why, we asked, should courts do the division? Why not let
the parties do it themselves? Insofar as commercial leases
are concerned, all the prerequisites for efficient bargaining
would seem to be present here: a small number of parties
(two), an established vehicle for conducting the negotiations
(the lease), and both parties typically represented by coun-
sel. Furthermore, provided the issue is addressed in the
lease-before condemnation takes place-there should be
no problem of ex post strategic behavior.'
Once we recognized the desirability of allowing the par-
ties to resolve the apportionment issue by private agree-
ment, the answer to the second question-how to establish
the size of the total award-fell into place. The so-called un-
divided fee rule is clearly superior to valuing the interests of
the landlord and tenant separately and summing, because
the former establishes a structure that facilitates private
agreements. Under the undivided fee rule, the govern-
ment's only interest is in the size of the total award, estab-
lished by valuing the property as if there were no lease.
Once the total award is fixed, the government in effect drops
out of the picture. What begins as an eminent domain pro-
ceeding ends up resembling a private interpleader action,
with the landlord and tenant fighting over the division of a
fixed stake. On the other hand, if the interests of the land-
lord and tenant were valued separately and then summed, it
is unclear what role, if any, condemnation clauses would
1. When we investigated the matter, we found that long-term commercial
leases routinely do include so-called "condemnation clauses" that specify how
condemnation awards should be apportioned between landlord and tenant. The
soundness of the theory was confirmed by practice. For examples of the condem-
nation clauses, see 2 M. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES H 665-82 (1983); 7A P.
ROHAN & M. RESKEN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.07, at 11-16-11-37 (3d
ed. 1984).
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play. The valuation of each separate interest would affect
the size of the total award payable by the government, and
thus the government's interests would be directly implicated
by the terms of any private agreement concerning compen-
sation. Assuming the government was not a party to these
agreements, it could not be bound by them. Condemnation
clauses would inevitably become irrelevant, and the issues of
both apportionment and the size of the total award would
have to be decided by the courts.
Once we settled on the desired approaches to the ap-
portionment and total valuation questions, the answer to the
first issue, concerning who should have a constitutionally
protected property right, became obvious: it doesn't really
matter. The assignment of property rights will not affect the
value of the total award, since that is determined by valuing
the property as an undivided fee. And the assignment of
property rights will not control the ultimate apportionment
of the award, because the parties can freely contract around
the apportionment rules by negotiating an appropriate con-
demnation clause.
Although we developed our framework by working
backward from condemnation clauses, for expository pur-
poses we will proceed forward. In Part I, we will consider
briefly the question of who should have a constitutionally
protected property right. As suggested above, the impor-
tant question is whether the parties can negotiate around the
compensation rules established by law. We argue that in the
only context in which both the landlord and the tenant are
likely to have significant rights to compensation-long-term
commercial leases-it makes sense to allow the parties to
waive their constitutional rights and substitute a private
agreement governing the distribution of condemnation
awards.
In Part II, we address the question of how to determine
the size of the total award. Here, we strongly endorse the
traditional undivided fee rule. No matter how the award is
apportioned, the sum of the landlord's and the tenant's indi-
vidual awards should always equal the value of the undivided
fee simple. The undivided fee rule will not only facilitate ex
ante agreements between landlord and tenant concerning
the apportionment of condemnation awards, we argue that it
is also correct as a conceptual matter.
108519871
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In Part III, we maintain that the total award should, if
possible, be apportioned between the landlord and tenant
by ex ante agreement, rather than by ex post litigation. By al-
lowing the parties to allocate the condemnation award by
prior agreement, we maximize their ability to tailor the relief
to their specific circumstances. Futhermore, a clear ex ante
agreement will minimize strategic behavior2 that shrinks the
total award available for division. When courts set aside a
condemnation clause in order to apportion the award in a
way that seems, ex post, to be more "fair," they encourage
conduct that ultimately leaves landlords and tenants as a
class worse off.
In Part IV, we analyze the leading modern Supreme
Court decision concerning the condemnation of leased
property-Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
States.3 The decision illustrates the confusion that arises
when courts fail to distinguish between the value of the total
award and its division among the contending parties. In an-
alyzing Almota, we highlight one bona fide problem: the pos-
sibility that the government and the landlord might collude
to reduce the amount of compensation the tenant would
otherwise be entitled to receive under the lease.
Finally, in concluding, we suggest ways in which our
framework for handling the condemnation of leased prop-
erty might prove useful in resolving other issues that arise in
eminent domain, such as the condemnation of future inter-
ests and the condemnation of contractual rights.
I. THE TENANT'S RIGHT To COMPENSATION
The established rule states that both the landlord and
the tenant have a constitutionally protected "property" in-
2. By "strategic behavior," we refer to what economists often describe as
"rent seeking behavior." In order to avoid obvious confusion between economic
rents and lease rents, however, we will forego any references to rent seeking in
this paper and will speak only of strategic behavior. In general, both terms refer
to wasteful or inefficient competition, as opposed to efficient or wealth-maximiz-
ing competition. See generally TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J.
Buchanan, R. Tollison, & G. Tullock eds. 1980); Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, Verti-
cal Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1978); Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1561 (1987).
3. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
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terest when leased property is taken in eminent domain. 4
There is a natural inclination, at least on the part of lawyers,
to attach great significance to this fact. If the tenant has a
constitutionally protected property right, then he is entitled
to compensation under the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment;5 if the tenant does not have a property
right, he is not.6 It is also well established, however, that the
landlord and tenant, by agreeing upon an appropriate con-
demnation clause as part of the lease, may modify the divi-
sion of any condemnation award that would otherwise be
directed by the courts. 7 This rule significantly modifies the
first rule, rewriting it to say in effect that the tenant has a
constitutionally protected property right absent language in the
lease to the contrary. Thus, the property label does not resolve
the question of compensation in an eminent domain pro-
ceeding. It merely establishes a default rule that applies in
the absence of a contrary specification of rights in the lease.
We will not, at this point, ask what the correct default
rule should be.8 The more important question here is
4. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945);
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 377 (1876).
5. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that the takings
clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978).
Furthermore, all states either have takings clauses in their state constitutions or
otherwise recognize as a matter of state constitutional law that the government
must compensate for a taking of private property. 1 J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 1-91 (3d ed. 1985). We do not in this
article differentiate between federal and state constitutional law in considering the
appropriate approach to the condemnation of leased property.
6. Note that the question whether the tenant's interest is "property" for con-
stitutional purposes is distinct from the question whether the tenant's interest is
properly categorized as a property right or a contract right at common law. See
generally Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 443
(1972). Contract rights have been held to be "property" within the meaning of
the takings clause, at least when the government appropriates the entire contrac-
tual interest. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); Lynch
v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 502 (1923). Under these authorities, if the government condemns a
leasehold estate outright, the tenant would appear to be entitled to compensation,
whether or not his interest is held to be a property right at common law.
7. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); 4 M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 1, at 490; 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 12.42[2], at 12-793; 5A G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 2583
(1978).
8. In Part III, we suggest that the default rule is probably wrong, as indicated
by the frequency with which the parties contract around it. But if contractual
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whether the parties should be allowed to contract out of the
default rule, i.e., should be allowed to waive their constitu-
tional rights to compensation. 9 We can think of two possible
reasons why the parties should not be allowed to waive their
rights. First, one or both of the parties could lack contrac-
tual capacity, either in the strict traditional sense of infancy,
insanity, or duress, t0 or in the loose modern sense of "une-
qual bargaining power."" Second, waiver of the right to
compensation could impose external costs on third par-
ties.' 2 On close examination, however, neither of these rea-
sons applies to the situation under review. Apportionment
of condemnation awards between landlord and tenant is a
significant issue only in the case of long-term commercial
leases, and contractual incapacity and third party effects are
not plausible reasons for refusing to enforce provisions in
long-term commercial leases.
To see why apportionment of condemnation awards be-
comes an issue only in the world of long-term commercial
leases, it is useful to begin by considering why tenants hold-
ing short-term leases rarely press takings claims, and why,
when they do, such claims have generally been denied.' 3 As-
sume a tenant, T, has leased an apartment for a term of one
year at a rental of $500 per month. Six months into the
term, the government condemns the building in which the
apartment is located. The general constitutional rule, as we
have seen, is that T has a property right entitled to compen-
modification is freely available, and is enforced by the courts, the choice of an
inefficient default rule is probably not a major concern.
9. The general rule, of course, is that constitutional rights may be waived.
For example, suspects may waive their fourth amendment rights by agreeing to a
search, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and government em-
ployees may waive their first amendment rights by agreeing to submit future writ-
ings to prior review by their agency. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
10. See Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcON. 293
(1975).
11. See, e.g., Goldberg, Institutional Change'and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17J.L. &
ECON. 461 (1974); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-
Benthamite Economics in the House of the Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 359 (1976).
12. See Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation? 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985) (dis-
cussing contexts in which free alienation may impose costs on third parties); Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931
(1985).
13. See 2J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.06[4], at
5-129 (3d ed. 1985) (tenants with a month-to-month lease have no compensable
property interest).
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sation. Indeed, T has lost a valuable interest-the right to
possession of the apartment for the next six months.
But under modern landlord-tenant law, condemnation
of the entire leased premises is regarded as an event termi-
nating the lease.' 4 In effect, the condemnation excuses T
from paying what would otherwise be a binding obligation
to pay the landlord, L, $3,000 over the next six months. If
we assume that the fair market value of the six months' lost
possession is roughly equal to the contract rent (as it gener-
ally would be for short-term leases),15 then the release of the
$3,000 debt exactly offsets the value of the lost possession.
Thus, rather than have a complicated three-way transaction
whereby T seeks $3,000 in compensation from the govern-
ment, and then turns the $3,000 over to L in satisfaction of
the debt created by the lease, the law has short-circuited the
process by forgiving T's $3,000 debt to L. In the language
of takings literature, the cancellation of T's lease obligation
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 7.1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1974); 2 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY § 247[2], at 372.143; 4 J.
SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.42[l], at 12-785 (3d ed.
1985). The early rule seems to have been that eminent domain, not being an
eviction by the landlord or one holding by paramount title, did not affect the cov-
enant to pay rent. See, e.g., Parks v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. (1 Pick.) 198 (1834);
Folts v. Huntley, 7 Wend. 211 (1831); Foote v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 408
(1842). This is consistent with the well known decision in Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn
27, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647), which held that physical ouster of the tenant by
a third party not acting under direction of the landlord does not excuse payment
of rent. Courts began to change the rule in the later part of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but did not agree on the underlying rationale. See Corrigan v. Chicago, 144
11. 537, 33 N.E. 746 (1893) (while condemnation may not be a technical eviction,
where entire tract is taken it is, in effect, an eviction by paramount title); O'Brien
v. Ball, 119 Mass. 28 (1875) (landlord cannot continue to collect rent on an estate
after he no longer owns the estate); Lodge v. Martin, 31 A.D. 13, 14, 52 N.Y.S.
385, 386 (1898) ("[N]either justice nor reason.. . would permit a party to collect
rent for the use and occupation of lands which he does not own."). Nichols ad-
vances another reason for this transformation which, unlike the others, is con-
cerned with the circumstances of the landlord rather than the tenant: after the
tenant has been deprived of occupation, and has been given compensation for his
loss, the tenant's obligation to pay rent would be an unsecured personal liability.
"Such an arrangement would not only be inequitable, but would probably be un-
constitutional, as it would amount to depriving the owner of his security for rent
without compensation .... Termination of the obligation to pay rent [is prefera-
ble] . . . even if it is not easy to justify this practice upon strict legal theory." 4 J.
SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.42[1], at 12-786 (3d ed.
1985).
15. At least in the absence of sudden and unanticipated changes in property
values or currency values.
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provides him with "implicit in-kind" compensation for his
loss of possession. ' 6
To be sure, T may have a subjective attachment to the
apartment or may especially value the lease for other rea-
sons. 17 Indeed, it is plausible to assume that, at least at the
beginning of the lease, the tenant always attaches greater
value to the leasehold than is reflected in the contract rent-
otherwise he would not agree to the lease. But it is well es-
tablished that the government is not constitutionally re-
quired to compensate T for lost subjective value or
consumer surplus.18 Thus, if T were actually to seek com-
pensation, he would be awarded the market rental value,
which in a short-term lease should equal, or at least closely
approximate, the contract rent.
As the foregoing example suggests, the difficult issues
surrounding the condemnation of leased property are al-
most exclusively a by-product of long-term leases. Only
with long-term leases are we likely to see a substantial diver-
gence between market rent and contract rent, or substantial
capital improvements by the tenant, or other circumstances
that generate out-of-pocket losses for the tenant above and
beyond the implicit compensation afforded by cancellation
of the lease.
Typically, long-term leases are commercial.' 9 Thus we
can be fairly confident that contractual incapacity is not a
16. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 195-215 (1985); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1182,
1218-26 (1967).
17. See Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986) (dis-
cussing the "personhood" interests that residential tenants may have in their
leasehold).
18. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943). We do not question this rule here. It
could be that the rule is bad, but if so, it should be changed across the board, not
simply in cases in which there happens to be leased property.
19. There are exceptions of course. See, e.g., City & County of Honolulu v.
Midkiff, 62 Haw. 411, 616 P.2d 213 (1980), involving a condemnation that took
place on property subject to one of Hawaii's long-term residential ground leases.
See generally Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The lease in
question included a condemnation clause that protected the tenant's interest in
improvements, but awarded the bonus value to the landlord, 616 P.2d at 215,
exactly what one would expect to find in a long-term commercial lease. Neverthe-
less, the court remanded for findings as to whether the clause, by depriving the
tenant of any share of the appreciation in land values that had taken place after
the lease was negotiated, was "unconscionable." Id. at 218.
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pervasive problem. Typically, both the landlord and the
tenant have large economic stakes in a long-term commer-
cial lease; both parties are represented by counsel who spe-
cialize in such matters; and leases are subject to careful
review and often negotiated clause by clause. Even in the
case of a small retail store operator dealing with a large
shopping center, the tenant is likely to require financing,
and the mortgagee will generally take steps to ensure that its
interests, and thus indirectly the tenant's interests, are pro-
tected in the event of condemnation. Of course, there may
be isolated cases involving long-term commercial leases in
which it is appropriate to speak of asymmetric access to in-
formation, "unequal bargaining power," or even insanity.
But it is highly unlikely that a majority, or even a substantial
minority, of cases present these issues, or at least present
them in such an acute form that we should adopt a rule
prohibiting parties from contracting about condemnation
awards.
If contractual incapacity is seldom an issue in the case of
long-term commercial leases, there is even less reason to be-
lieve that contractual modification of condemnation awards
will implicate the interests of third parties. The sole func-
tion of condemnation clauses is to determine the landlord's
and tenant's respective shares of condemnation awards only
after the government has made a decision to change the alloca-
tion of resources by condemning property (presumably to
devote it to some other use). Such clauses have very little
effect on the use to which the property is put, the way it is
maintained, or other resource allocation issues that might
affect third parties. 20 Because condemnation clauses do not
themselves affect the allocation of resources, it is highly un-
likely that they impinge on the interests of third parties. 2'
In short, this is an area in which the institution of con-
tract should work well. In such a context, rules of constitu-
20. In Part IIIB, infra, we consider a partial exception to this point that arises
in situations in which tenants construct permanent improvements.
21. In fact, condemnation clauses should have no effect on the distribution of
wealth between landlords and tenants as a class, provided both landlords and ten-
ants have the capacity to make rational, well-informed decisions about the finan-
cial impact of different lease terms. If tenants as a class agree to clauses that
award landlords a larger share of condemnation awards than landlords would ob-
tain under the default rules, then tenants as a class presumably receive some off-
setting benefit in terms of concessions on other clauses, or lower rents.
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tional entitlement should be understood as default rules,
and private agreements modifying the default rules should
be presumptively enforceable. The legal regime thus should
be constructed, if at all possible, to facilitate rather than to
frustrate private ordering.
II. THE UNDIVIDED FEE RULE
The traditional rule that governs the condemnation of
leased property can be stated quite simply: the government
pays the fair market value of the interest it acquires. Usually
(but not always) this will be an undivided fee simple. Thus,
no matter how fractionalized or fragmented the state of title
may have been before the taking, if the government acquires
a fee simple, it must pay for a fee simple.
Historically, the conceptual basis for the undivided fee
rule is that eminent domain is an action in rem. The govern-
ment is condemning a particular piece of property-a
"res"-not the various interests that different parties have in
the property.2 2 As a leading nineteenth century case put it,
eminent domain entails a taking "not of the rights of desig-
nated persons in the thing needed, but of the thing itself."23
The government must accordingly pay the value of the
"thing," not the value of the various bundles of rights that
have been taken from the condemnees.
Whatever its conceptual foundations, the undivided fee
rule minimizes the government's involvement in the con-
demnation of leased property. Under the undivided fee ap-
proach, the government's sole interest is in establishing
what compensation would be owed if the property were sub-
ject to unified ownership. Once this is settled, the govern-
ment steps aside and lets the owners of the various fractional
interests divide the award. 24 This framework allows the par-
22. This is why federal eminent domain actions often have names such as
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984) and United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). The land is literally the defendant.
23. Crane v. City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Eq. 339, 343 (1882); see also A.W. Duck-
ett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); United States v. Dunnington, 146 U.S.
338, 352-53 (1892); Johnston, 'Just Compensation "for Lessor and Lessee, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 293, 313-16 (1969).
24. See, e.g., Vivian v. Board of Trustees, 152 Colo. 556, 383 P.2d 801, 803
(1963) ("Once the reasonable market value of property subject to eminent do-
main proceedings has been established, the apportionment of that amount among
1092 [Vol. 34:1083
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ties to apportion the compensation by condemnation
clauses-ex ante agreements negotiated as part of the lease.
(In Part III, we explain why the parties would rationally want
to resolve the apportionment question this way.)
Those who have questioned the undivided fee rule have
not done so out of any professed hostility toward condemna-
tion clauses. Rather, the opponents of the rule have gener-
ally rested their case, either explicitly or implicitly, on the
notion that the sum of the parts may not equal the whole.
We shall consider six such arguments. On close examina-
tion, it turns out that these arguments spring less from a dis-
agreement with the undivided fee rule than from some other
valuation principle associated with eminent domain.
The most important (and controversial) of these other
valuation conventions is what we will call the opportunity
cost formula for determining just compensation. In effect,
the Supreme Court has held that the measure of just com-
pensation is the condemnee's opportunity cost-"what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." 25 This
means, first of all, that the condemnee cannot recover any
value added to property by the government project that
gives rise to the condemnation. 26 The condemnee is enti-
tled only to the value of the property in its highest and best
use other than uses made possible only by the exercise of emi-
nent domain. Second, it means that the condemnee is not
entitled to compensation for what may be generically called
consequential damages. 27 That is, the condemnee cannot
recover for losses that would remain after a hypothetical sale
to a third party, such as lost subjective value (consumer sur-
persons claiming an interest therein is a matter of no concern to the
condemnor.").
25. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). See also United States v.
50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 n.l (1984). Notwithstanding that the market
value standard is well established, language of indemnity persists in taking cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) ("The owner is to be
put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken.").
26. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. at 375-82; Olson v. United States, 292
U.S. 246, 256 (1934); 3 J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 8.61, at 8-136-37.
27. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); Mullen Benevolent
Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933); Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S.
341, 344 (1925).
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plus), lost profits, lost business goodwill, relocation costs,
and attorneys fees. 28
Commentators have long debated the propriety of the
opportunity cost formula.29 We take no position on this is-
sue. We accept the basic policy as given, and submit that,
whether or not the opportunity cost formula is sound, it is
improper for courts to take the existence of a divided fee as
an excuse to subvert the formula. In other words, there is
no principled justification for applying the opportunity cost
measure of compensation to takings of fee simple property,
and some other standard-such as full indemnification-to
takings of property subject to divided ownership. If the op-
portunity cost formula is to be discarded, it should be dis-
carded across the board-and above board. 30
A. Divided Ownership Enhances Value, Ex Ante
Perhaps the most intuitively appealing argument sup-
porting the proposition that the sum of the parts may be dif-
28. See 2 J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, (3d ed.1985): id § 5.24 (business goodwill); id. § 8.10 (relocation costs); id. § 14.01(consequential damages); id. § 14.24[4] (attorney fees); see also Annotation, 58A.L.R.3d 566 (goodwill or "going concern" value as an element of lessee's com-
pensation for taking leasehold in eminent domain).
29. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 195-215; Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensa-
tion for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 619-20 (1984); Mer-
rill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
30. There are suggestions in the literature that courts are more likely to adoptindemnification standards when valuing the tenant's interest, in part because
there is no active secondary market. See Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold In-
terests, 48 VA. L. REV. 477, 519 (1962) (citing 4J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLSON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.42(3) (3d ed. 1985)) ("actual value," "intrinsic value to
owner"); see also Orange State Oil Co. v. Jacksonville Expressway Auth., 110 So.
2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ("value to owner"). This can create a problem
for the landlord. If the courts apply the opportunity cost formula in setting the
value of the undivided fee, but then at the apportionment stage apply an indemni-
fication standard in valuing the tenant's interest, the landlord can end up short-
changed. This potential problem is recognized in Harco Drug, Inc. v. Notsla, Inc.,
382 So. 2d I (Ala. 1980), where the tenant attempted to claim what amounted to
noncompensable business profits as part of the value of its leasehold. The court
stated that
[u]nder the existing undivided fee rule, similar considerations ...
could not have gone into computing the total award to the property
owner .... Therefore, an award to the lessee on the basis of the
leasehold's 'highest and best use' would amount to the owner's pay-
ing the lessee a sum which was not included in the total award made
by the condemnor and which the owner did not in fact receive.
Id. at 5.
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ferent from the whole rests on the observation that property
values are often enhanced by a division of ownership.3' In-
deed, the frequency with which property is leased suggests
that this arrangement is value-enhancing. Leasing is eco-
nomically beneficial because it permits specialization of
functions. The lease arrangement allows the landlord to
specialize in providing relatively fixed assets, such as land
and buildings, and allows the tenant to concentrate on pro-
viding relatively mobile assets, such as inventory, advertis-
ing, and labor. The arrangement is analogous to that
between a firm and its workers. The firm owns relatively
fixed assets, such as a factory and machinery, and hires work-
ers because the return on this investment will be higher if
workers operate the machinery than if the owners attempt to
do so themselves. Similarly, workers will hire on with the
firm because their productivity, and hence their return, will
be higher for a given level of effort if they are able to work
with machinery rather than without it.
But the fact that the division of ownership can increase
the value of property does not mean that the sum of the
parts is greater than the whole. It simply means that the po-
tential for dividing the fee in advantageous ways should al-
ways be taken into account in fixing the value of the
undivided fee. For example, assume that L owns a large
house which is currently used as a single family residence.
Next, assume that the rental value of the house in this use is
$500 per month, but if subdivided into apartments, the
house's total rental value would be $1000 per month. In val-
uing the property upon condemnation, should we capitalize
$500 per month (based on current use) or $1000 per month
(based on the highest and best use)? The answer clearly is
that we should base compensation on the highest and best
use, 32 which in this case assumes the potential for subdivid-
ing into apartments. Indeed, if the market value of the
house were determined by examining the sale prices of com-
parable properties, these prices would presumably reflect
the fact that large houses can be and often are subdivided
into apartments and leased.
31. See Johnston, supra note 23, at 300-01.
32. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943) ("The
value may reflect not only the use to which the property is presently devoted but
also that use to which it may be readily converted.").
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Note that the opportunity cost formula implicitly distin-
guishes between the highest and best use to which a single
parcel of property can be put, and the highest and best use
to which many contiguous or otherwise related parcels might
be put. Suppose that L's tract would have a ground rent
value of $2000 per month if assembled with nineteen other
contiguous parcels to make room for a shopping center.
Should this potential use be considered the highest and best
use for the property? The answer generally given is no, 33
and the rationale is straightforward. First, given the multi-
plicity of owners and the absence of any clear definition of
the scope of the project, the terms and the conditions of the
proposed assembly are highly speculative. Second, the pres-
ence of numerous different parcels subject to separate own-
ership increases transaction costs and the likelihood of
holdouts, and makes it unlikely that the parcel will ever be
assembled, at least without calling upon the power of emi-
nent domain. Consequently, the value added by assembly of
numerous contiguous properties would probably be attribu-
table only to the government's exercise of eminent domain,
and hence would be properly excluded under the opportu-
nity cost formula.34 In contrast, where a single parcel is in-
volved, or where there are several related parcels under
single ownership, one owner can make the appropriate deci-
sions about use without having recourse to eminent do-
main.35 In this interpretation, therefore potential value is,
thus, taken into account.
33. See City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915); United States v.Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 80-81 (1913). But see Olson v.United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) (suggesting that enhanced value causedby combination may be considered "if the possibility of combination is reasonably
sufficient to affect market value."). Conversely, if a single owner holds other par-
cels either contiguous to or adaptable for integrated use with the parcel being
taken, courts will frequently add an increment of value known as "assemblage" or
"plottage" value to the subject parcel. See Annotation, Eminent Domain-Assemblage
or Plottage, 8 A.L.R.4th 1202 (1981).
34. See City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. at 61 ("The City is not to be made
to pay for any part of what it has added to the land by thus uniting it with otherlots, if that union would not have been practicable or have been attempted except
by the intervention of eminent domain.").
35. In the next subsection we consider the intermediate case where a singleparcel is subject to multiple ownership, i.e., is divided between landlord and ten-
ant. We argue that the landlord-tenant case should be subject to the highest andbest use rule applicable to single parcels, rather than the rule that applies to many
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In short, the unique value of a particular lease does not
directly affect the determination of the total value of prop-
erty subject to condemnation. The value of a present lease
is relevant only as evidence of what the highest and best leas-
ing arrangement would be. Of course, the terms and condi-
tions of existing leases may be relevant to the question of
apportionment. An above-market lease may enhance the
landlord's share; a below market lease may enhance the ten-
ant's share. But in neither case should it affect the size of
the total award.
B. Divided Ownership Reduces Value, Ex Post
The preceding argument is one manifestation of a more
general point. The value of property can often be enhanced
by repackaging the "bundle of rights" in a manner that is
value-increasing. If the land is presently unencumbered, the
freedom to lease, to grant an easement, or to restrict future
uses or changes in title will make the land more valuable to
potential buyers. The other side of the coin is that once the
land has been encumbered, its value to future purchasers
may be adversely affected if tastes and preferences or other
circumstances change. For example, property located on a
residential street may be restricted to single family use, but
the street may eventually turn into a commercial strip.
These changed circumstances will reduce the value of the
property as a residence, but enhance its potential value as a
retail outlet. If the owners of the various interests in the
property were able to bargain with each other costlessly,
they could negotiate a release of any restrictions that are no
longer beneficial, thereby overcoming this problem. 36 But
there can be considerable bargaining difficulties. For exam-
ple, suppose a ten-year lease provides that the property can-
not be sublet or assigned without L's permission. After five
years have elapsed, the value of the property to a different
type of tenant has increased sharply, so the property could
be sublet at twice the current rental. Under the lease, L does
parcels, where aggregation of interests is generally prohibited in determining just
compensation.
36. This is a simple application of the Coase Theorem, which holds that, in a
world of zero (or at least very low) transaction costs the initial distribution of
entitlements will not affect the allocation of resources. See Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
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not have the unilateral right to terminate the lease and cap-
ture the increased value himself, nor does T have the unilat-
eral right to capture the increased value by subletting or
assigning. While clear gains from trade would result from
either prematurely terminating the lease or waiving the re-
striction on subletting, it is possible that strategic bargaining
by the two parties would prevent their reaching either of
these outcomes.3 7
The parties have an incentive to consider these poten-
tial future problems when negotiating the lease, and often
they do. When they do not, it is often difficult to know what
agreement they would have reached. However, in the con-
text of a government condemnation, such agreement is easy
to determine: ex ante, the parties would always agree, if they
considered the matter, that any provision in the lease (such
as a prohibition of subletting or assigning) that prevents the
property from achieving its highest and best use would auto-
matically terminate in the event of a taking by eminent do-
main. Failure to include such a clause would be equivalent
to rejecting free money. It seems unreasonable to attribute
such a perverse desire to the parties absent explicit evidence
that this is their intent.
Significantly, the undivided fee rule operates exactly
like such a lease clause. By requiring the total award to
equal the value of an unrestricted fee simple, the rule com-
putes the condemnation award in a way that ignores any re-
striction on use that, ex post, would diminish the value of the
property. Thus, the undivided fee rule is consistent with the
hypothetical contract reasonable parties would have made if
they had considered the matter.
At first blush, this feature of the undivided fee rule
might appear at odds with the previously noted rule refusing
to recognize any potential value created by assembling many
contiguous or otherwise related property interests. The un-
divided fee rule in effect "assembles" the separate interests
of the landlord and tenant into a single unified interest,
eliminating any paper encumbrances, i.e., restrictive clauses
37. For discussion of this point in the context of servitude, see Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV.
615 (1985).
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in the lease, 38 that might diminish the value of the whole.
But on closer examination, this tension disappears. Here,
unlike agreements involving many contiguous parcels, there
is nothing speculative about the agreement the parties
would reach had they considered the matter. They would
always agree to eliminate paper encumbrances that would
reduce value in the event of condemnation. In addition,
there is no question here but that the "assembly" of the indi-
vidual interests would be agreed upon without use of the
power of eminent domain. One party-the landlord-has a
direct negotiating relationship with each tenant, and formal
negotiation always occurs in the course of drawing up the
lease. Consequently, here, unlike agreements involving
many contiguous parcels, application of the undivided fee
rule to override paper encumbrances is consistent with the
opportunity cost formula.
C. Offsetting Benefits
Some commentators have argued that if there is a
marked discrepancy between the market value of the undi-
vided fee and the values of the various interests considered
separately, the court should depart from the undivided fee
rule.3 9 The case generally cited to support this proposition
is Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston.40 This, however, is a
misreading of the decision-a misreading abetted by Justice
Holmes' obscure exposition. The misinterpretations arise
because of Holmes' implicit application of the "offsetting
benefits" rule;4' once this is recognized, Boston Chamber of
Commerce becomes a simple case which does precisely what
we have suggested: it ignores paper encumbrances that re-
38. Note that a lease encumbrance is different in this respect from a physical
encumbrance. If the property includes a physical structure, the opportunity cost
measure of compensation is the value of the property with the structure in place,
or its value in another use less the cost of removing the structure, whichever is
higher. The cost of removing a physical structure is a real cost which could be
substantial. The cost of removing a paper restriction, however, is zero. The undi-
vided fee rule recognizes this distinction by ignoring lease encumbrances, includ-
ing the lease and all its peculiar terms, in fixing the size of the total condemnation
award.
39. See L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 111 (2d
ed. 1953) (referring to Boston Chamber of Commerce as the leading case); Johnston,
supra note 23.
40. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
41. Discussed infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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duce value ex post and allows the parties to divide the award
ex ante as they see fit.
Although the division of the fee in Boston Chamber of Com-
merce involved an easement rather than a lease, the facts are
still instructive. The Boston Chamber of Commerce owned
a parcel of land (the servient estate) over which it had
granted an easement in the form of a private street to the
Central Wharf and Wet Dock Corporation (the dominant es-
tate). The City of Boston condemned the land in question in
order to build a public thoroughfare. The parties stipulated
that the value of the property as an undivided fee simple was
$60,000. However, given the improbability that the Wharf
Company would have agreed to release the easement and
permit the fee to be developed for other purposes, they fur-
ther stipulated that the value of the servient estate alone was
only $5,000. After the City had taken the land, the Chamber
of Commerce and the Wharf Company agreed to eliminate
the easement (which is exactly what they would have agreed
upon ex ante if they had anticipated the taking). Accordingly,
they asked to be compensated for the value of the land as an
unrestricted fee simple-$60,000. The City objected, argu-
ing that the Chamber of Commerce was entitled to $5,000,
the value of its separate interest, and the Wharf Company
was entitled to nothing, "as it lost nothing by the superposi-
tion of a public easement upon its own." 42
The trial judge gave a directed verdict for $5,000 which
was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court. Justice Holmes stated that it
would not be proper to allow a simple joinder of interest
after the taking had occurred in order to make the City "pay
for a loss of theoretical creation suffered by no one in
fact."43
Boston Chamber of Commerce seems to repudiate the undi-
vided fee rule. As we have seen, the rule rests (in part) on a
presumed intention that the parties would have agreed to
release all paper encumbrances that would interfere with
maximizing the value of the fee. Boston Chamber of Commerce
seems to say that such a release should not be permitted,
because it would result in an undeserved windfall. This
42. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 217 U.S. at 193.
43. Id. at 194.
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reading of the case, however, is neither compelled nor
desirable.
First, it is not correct to say that the condemned prop-
erty was "really" worth only $5,000. The owner of the dom-
inant estate lost a valuable property right. It is reasonable to
presume that the easement was worth at least $55,000. If it
were worth significantly less, then the Chamber of Com-
merce could have purchased a release of the easement from
the Wharf Company and converted the land to the higher
valued alternative use.44 Approaching the problem from a
slightly different angle, we can ask, what was the highest and
best use of the undivided fee? If the Chamber of Commerce
owned an undivided fee, it could have used the land in such
a way as to capture its highest value-$60,000. Alterna-
tively, it could have sold an easement (or leased the land) to
the Wharf Company. Its value in this latter use should be at
least $55,000, otherwise the Chamber of Commerce would
not have agreed to this arrangement. The precise magni-
tude of the value of the easement is unimportant, what is
important is that the easement was clearly valuable, and that
Holmes recognized that it was valuable.
Given that a valuable easement was taken, how could
Holmes characterize this as "a loss of theoretical creation
suffered by no one in fact"? The answer is that while the
condemnor took a valuable easement with one hand, it re-
turned a nearly equally valuable public right of way with the
other. Some jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, 45 allow
the condemnor to offset benefits generated by the project in
determining the final amount of "just compensation" paya-
ble to the condemnee.46 Holmes in effect applied the offset-
ting benefits doctrine without stating that he had done so.
Because the public right-of-way was nearly as valuable to the
Wharf Company as the private easement, the net result was
to deny it all compensation.
The result would be no different had the fee been uni-
fied. Suppose the Wharf Company owned the land in fee
simple. It would lose its private road plus whatever value
might be obtained from the balance of the fee (mineral or
44. This is another application of the Coase Theorem. See supra note 36.
45. See, e.g., Hilbourne v. County of Suffolk, 120 Mass. 393 (1876).
46. This again manifests the point that explicit compensation is not required
when implicit compensation has been given. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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excavation rights, air rights, rights to future development,
etc.) which, we may assume, was worth $5,000. Against this,
however, it would receive the use of the public right-of-way.
If the offsetting benefits rule were not applied, the Wharf
Company would receive the full value of the parcel based on
its highest and best use-$60,000. If the offsetting benefits
rule were applied, the Wharf Company would receive
$5,000. Thus, regardless of the form of ownership, the par-
ties would receive a total of $60,000 if the offsetting benefits
rule were not applied and $5,000 if it were applied. That the
fee was divided is irrelevant to the outcome. 47
Thus, correctly analyzed, Boston Chamber of Commerce
does not establish an exception to the undivided fee rule.
The case demonstrates only that, regardless of the form of
ownership, the offsetting benefits rule can be a complicating
factor in determining the correct measure of just
compensation.
D. Negative Leasehold
Because condemnation is regarded as an event that
cancels the lease, the tenant's property right is in most cases
equal to his benefit of the bargain. Thus, the tenant is enti-
tled to compensation for the "bonus value": the difference
between the contract rent and the market rent for the term
of the lease. If the market rent exceeds the contract rent,
the bonus is positive. If the reverse is true, the bonus would
be negative. 48 Some argue that when the bonus is nega-
tive-i.e., the tenant holds a so-called "negative lease-
hold"-the sum of the parts may be greater than the
whole. 49
47. In fact, the statute under which the land was condemned required the
application of the undivided fee rule. It provided:
[The jury] shall first find and set forth in their verdict the total
amount of damages sustained by the owners of such property, esti-
mating the same as an entire estate and as if it were the sole property
of one owner in fee simple; and they shall then apportion such dam-
ages among the several parties whom they find to be entitled thereto
Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 195 Mass. 338, 345, 81 N.E. 244, 245
(1907), aff 'd, 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
48. The tenant's interest also includes the value of improvements to which he
has title. The higher the value of these improvements, ceterisparibus, the less likely
it is that the leasehold would have a negative value.
49. See Polasky, supra note 30, at 492 n.59.
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In order to evaluate the validity of this claim, consider
the following example. L leases property to T for $1000 per
month. The market value of the leasehold subsequently falls
to $500 per month. If the property is condemned, the undi-
vided fee rule requires that the total award be based on the
fair market value of the fee, which would be $500 per month
capitalized. Note, however, that L has really lost much more
than this. He has lost not only the right to earn $500 per
month, but also the right to earn an additional $500 per
month for the duration of the favorable lease with T. The
capitalized value of this second right plus the fair market
value of the fee is clearly greater than the value of the fee
alone. In this situation, the argument runs, the sum of the
parts is greater than the whole.
The argument, however, fails to consider that although
L is undercompensated by the undivided fee rule, T is
overcompensated. In effect, the taking of the property has re-
leased T from the obligation to pay an additional $500 per
month-the contract rent minus its fair market value. This
windfall gain exactly offsets L's loss, leaving on net the value
of the undivided fee. If the law required full compensation
for L in the event of a negative leasehold, but did not re-
quire T to disgorge his windfall gain, 50 then the whole would
indeed be less than the sum of the parts. But this divergence
in the value of the unencumbered fee from the value of the
parts would be an illusion created by a failure to reckon the
windfall to T.
Rigorous adherence to the undivided fee rule eliminates
the negative leasehold problem. The government compen-
sates for the value of the unencumbered fee and leaves the
task of dividing up the award to the landlord and tenant.
The possibility of a negative leasehold is a contingency for
which the parties could have planned when entering the
lease. If they thought that full compensation to the landlord
was appropriate, they could design a condemnation clause
that required the tenant to make an additional payment to
the landlord if the fee were taken by eminent domain. For
reasons discussed in Part III, it is unlikely that the parties
would choose such a division. Indeed, the typical condem-
50. See id. at 492 ("No cases have been found, and it is unlikely that any court
will so decide at the present time, that the lessee contribute or pay the negative
value of his interest upon a complete taking.").
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nation clause awards the entire bonus, positive or negative,
to the landlord.
E. The Valuation of Interrelated Parcels
Suppose the values of parcels A and B are contingent
upon the use to which the other is put. For example, A may
have easement rights to B's beach, and B may have easement
rights to A's beach. Or A and B may have reciprocal cove-
nants limiting each to use as a single family residence. If
only A is taken, how should this parcel be valued? Should
we take into account A's rights in B in setting the award to
A? 5' Alternatively (or additionally), should B have a sepa-
rate action for compensation for its loss of rights in A? 52
These are extremely difficult problems when servitudes are
involved. 53 However, these valuation problems rarely arise
in the landlord-tenant context, except perhaps in the partial
taking of a shopping center. If the condemnor were to take
the flagship store, the value of the remaining stores and of
the entire center would be adversely affected.
To what extent should the losses of the other tenants be
reckoned in the condemnation proceeding? The losses
should be taken into account, but not directly. If the reduc-
tion in value would have been taken into account if the shop-
ping center had been operated as an undivided fee, then it
should be treated the same way if the various units are
leased. The damage is the difference between the highest
and best use for the land (and structures) before the taking
and the highest and best use which remains after the taking.
The price terms of the leases with the various tenants should
not be taken into account when determining the overall
magnitude of the taking. Those terms (along with the con-
51. If the result of the taking happens to be beneficial to B, should the recipi-
ent be taxed? The legal treatment of the problems of offsetting benefits is dis-
cussed above in the context of Boston Chamber of Commerce.
52. [Tjhe mere fact that the taking of one piece of real estate may re-
sult in a material fall in the value to the owner (possibly even in the
market value) of the owner's real-estate holdings is apparently insuf-
ficient to bring the case into the category of a partial-taking case.
There must be a very obvious physical relationship between the prop-
erty that is taken and the property that is left in order to induce the
court to allow a recovery of damages to the remaining property.
L. ORGEL, supra note 39, § 47, at 228-29.
53. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d
964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973).
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demnation clauses) should only be considered when deter-
mining the apportionment of the award. 54
F. Valuation Difficulties
Appraisal of property is a complicated, imperfect busi-
ness. A fee simple is generally easier to value than other
interests, because it is more likely that there will be an active
secondary market. Thus, the value of the fee can often be
developed by examining sales of comparable property. Par-
tial interests like leases are only rarely bought and sold in a
secondary market. Thus, valuation of these sorts of interests
must be developed in some other way, such as by capitaliz-
ing current rental value. These indirect methods of comput-
ing fair market value are dependent on uncertain values (i.e.,
the current rental value and the discount rate) which are
generally speculative and contentious.
Not surprisingly, an appraiser using the best available
valuation techniques may arrive at a value for the whole that
differs markedly from the value given by a second appraiser
valuing the landlord's and tenant's interests separately. 55
But the fact that divergent measures of value exist does not
prove that the undivided fee rule is wrong. It simply means
that we must determine which method of valuation provides
the best estimate. For the reasons stated, that will generally
be valuation of the unencumbered fee simple.
If the award must be apportioned between the landlord
and the tenant, then divergent measures of value present a
problem. The best solution to this problem is a system of
apportionment that would make it unnecessary for courts to
measure the value of the separate interests. One way of ac-
54. The leases might include terms which allow for a modification of the rent
in the face of changed circumstances. Shopping center leases routinely provide
for such modifications. See B. POLLACK, BusINESS AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SHOP-
PING CENTERS 78-79 (J. McCord ed. 1968); id. at 102 (sample lease).
55. The likelihood that these values will diverge increases substantially if the
appraisers are allowed to use techniques that are unsound. Our interest in the
condemnation of leaseholds was initially stimulated by City of Ashland v. Price,
318 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1958), a case presented in C. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 163 (1984), as an illustration of how courts can misunder-
stand the concepts of interest rates and discounting. In Ashland, the court valued
the leasehold interest by first calculating the bonus value for each year and then
summing these values without discounting them. Cf Land Clearance for Redevel-
opment Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389 S.W.2d 780, 788 (Mo. 1965) (requiring dis-
counting, but noting that, at least as of 1965, this was a minority position).
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complishing this-perhaps the only way-is to apportion the
award by condemnation clauses negotiated when entering
into the lease. We now turn our attention to this topic.
III. DIVIDING THE AWARD
The tenant's right to share in the condemnation award
arises from the characterization of his interest as a property
right. As discussed in Part I, the property label merely es-
tablishes the default rule. The tenant is entitled to compen-
sation only if the parties do not agree otherwise. If this
apportionment rule were a good one, the parties would
choose it even if the tenant were not entitled to compensa-
tion as a matter of law. In fact, the frequency with which
parties contract out of the default rule demonstrates that it is
generally not desirable.
Does this mean the rule should be changed? If we were
writing on a blank slate, we would change it. Fewer re-
sources will be consumed in negotiating and drafting leases
if the default rules are efficient, i.e., if they reflect the result
upon which the parties would generally agree in any event.
But we are not writing on a blank slate. There are probably
tens of thousands of leases in force that have been drafted
with the existing default rules in mind. It is not clear how
these leases would be affected by a modification in the rele-
vant background understanding. Moreover, it is not realistic
to think this issue is one that will attract the attention of law
reformers any time soon.
A more sensible approach is to continue to recognize
the existing default rules, predicated on the notion that the
tenant has a compensable property right, but to facilitate-
rather than frustrate-contractual revision of these rules. If
courts read condemnation clauses with a sympathetic eye,
interpreting the inevitable ambiguities in a manner that ef-
fectuates the bargain reached by the parties ex ante, then it
will be of little consequence that most parties do not like the
default rules. Unfortunately, the courts have taken the op-
posite tack, especially in recent years. They increasingly
view condemnation clauses with suspicion, if not hostility,
and construe ambiguities in such a way as to undermine
clauses that give a large share of condemnation awards to
the landlord.
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The remainder of this Part is organized as follows.
First, we discuss the advantages of establishing a mechanism
for dividing the condemnation award at the time the lease is
negotiated, rather than waiting until a taking actually occurs.
Second, we ask what terms a reasonable landlord and tenant
would include in a condemnation clause. Third, we discuss
judicial hostility toward condemnation clauses, especially
those that increase the landlord's share of the award.
A. Ex Ante Division
Commercial leases cover a wide variety of landlord-ten-
ant relationships, ranging from a standard lease of space, to
complicated arrangements whereby the landlord and tenant
both provide capital improvements, to long-term ground
leases in which the tenant erects a high-rise office building.
The parties' interests will vary with the circumstances. Even
a good default rule could not accommodate all of these in-
terests. However, if we encourage the parties to allocate
condemnation awards ex ante, they can create a system of
protection that is responsive to their unique needs and that
provides the correct incentives for the parties to interact co-
operatively over time. This is simply a variation on the stan-
dard argument for freedom of contract, and the allocative
advantages of private ordering.
A second and less obvious reason for settling the appor-
tionment issue ex ante is that it minimizes the potential for
strategic behavior that may ultimately leave both parties
worse off. Suppose the government condemns valuable
property encumbered with a long-term lease. The award is,
say, $20 million, and the rules for division have not been
specified in the lease. At the time of the taking both parties
have an incentive to expend considerable resources in litiga-
tion, pursuing a larger share of the award. The amount they
expend will depend on the potential rewards to litigation ac-
tivity. Thus, if there were an unambiguous rule that the en-
tire award goes to the landlord, there would be no incentive
for the tenant and landlord to litigate against each other.
On the other hand, under a rule that the tenant is entitled to
the discounted value of the difference between the contract
rent and the market rent, the parties could expend consider-
able resources in establishing the market rent and the
proper discount rate; if the contract rent was to be adjusted
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during the life of the lease (or if it was to be determined in
part as a percentage of the gross sales or some other mea-
sure), the parties would have an incentive to spend even
more.
Every dollar spent in litigation is, of course, a dollar that
ends up in the pocket of neither the landlord nor the tenant.
The net award available to them is the gross award less the
amount they expend in litigation. Consequently, it is in
their mutual interest when entering into the lease to adopt
rules that discourage strategic behavior, since the larger net
award without such behavior can potentially make both par-
ties better off.56 Even if the solution involves 100% of the
award going to the landlord (as will often be the case), the
arrangement can be mutually beneficial. The tenant may ob-
tain offsetting concessions from the landlord, or may receive
a modest rent concession. But even if there is no explicit
quid pro quo or bargaining over the issue, competition in
the commercial rental market, if it is sufficiently vigorous,
should cause rents to fall. Of course, since ex ante the likeli-
hood of condemnation is low, the rent reduction is apt to be
small. 57
The point is the familiar one about the dangers of bilat-
eral monopoly. If the apportionment issue is settled when
the lease is drafted, neither side is in a position to engage in
strategic behavior. The market for leases is likely to be fairly
56. This, of course, is the basic reason why parties to long-term commercial
contracts frequently agree to arbitration, rather than litigation, as a means of
resolving disputes that arise during the course of the relationship.
57. The low probability of condemnation introduces a complication that
makes it impossible to prove a priori that condemnation clauses are more efficient
than expost litigation. Suppose that negotiation of a condemnation clause satisfac-
tory to both parties would cost $100, and that expost litigation over apportionment
of a condemnation award would cost $10,000. Nevertheless, negotiation would
minimize the total expenditure of resources only if the probability of condemna-
tion is at least .01. If the probability is less-if it is say .009-then the expected
cost of litigation would be only $90 (.009 x $10,000), which is less than the cost of
negotiating a satisfactory condemnation clause. Under such circumstances, one
would expect that the parties would either not negotiate a condemnation clause,
or that they would spend such a small amount of resources in negotiations that
the resulting clause would not necessarily reflect their true interests. Although we
cannot prove that the low-probability problem is insubstantial, we note (a) that
many if not most long-term commercial leases do include condemnation clauses,
and (b) that as we shall see in the next subsection, the provisions of these clauses
generally seem to make sense given the circumstances of the parties. There is
thus some circumstantial evidence that the low probability problem is not so seri-
ous that it destroys the case for condemnation clauses.
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competitive on both the landlord's and the tenant's side, and
if either party holds out, the other can seek a different bar-
gaining partner. But if the apportionment issue is not set-
tled in the lease, each side in effect has a monopoly over a
valuable resource-its consent to a particular division of the
condemnation award. Conceivably, the parties could negoti-
ate the apportionment ex post without engaging in strategic
behavior. But this seems unlikely. The problem is similar to
the division of a large estate in the absence of a valid will.
The greater the potential rewards, the more difficult it will
be for the interested parties to resist litigating. 58 By adopt-
ing a clear lease clause dictating the apportionment of any
future condemnation award, the parties, like Ulysses, strap
themselves to the mast and avoid the siren song of strategic
behavior.
B. Apportioning the Award
Other things being equal, the best apportionment rule
would avoid any ex post measurement of the parties' respec-
tive interests. Measurement of the separate interests in-
creases the costs of a condemnation proceeding both
directly, as resources are expended in measurement, and in-
directly, by providing an incentive for strategic behavior.
The standard condemnation clause avoids the measurement
problem by having the lease terminate upon condemnation
and giving the entire award to the landlord. It is not neces-
sary, however, that the landlord receive 100% of the award.
Any fixed percentage would serve the same purpose (includ-
ing 100% to the tenant). A clause that allocated the first
$100,000 to the landlord, the next $100,000 to the tenant,
and the remainder to the landlord would also eliminate mea-
58. See generally Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of
Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1983). For example, when Howard Hughes died
intestate in 1976, the absence of a will clarifying the financial interests of surviving
parties, combined with the enormity of the "prize"-estimated at $1.5 billion-
provoked an explosion of litigation. See, e.g., Howard Hughes Medical Inst. v.
Neff, 640 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1982) (Medical Institute claims to be principal benefi-
ciary of lost will); Moore v. Neff, 629 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1982) (woman claims to
have married Hughes at sea in 1949). In addition, the states of California and
Texas engaged in extensive litigation over which jurisdiction was entitled to death
taxes on the Hughes estate. See, e.g., California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982);
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982). Although the two states reached an agreement
over death taxes in 1984, the proceeds of the estate still have not, at least as of this
writing, been distributed to Hughes' legal heirs.
19871 1109
UCLA LAW REVIEW
surement costs. 59 Since other things are not always equal,
the efficient condemnation clause will not always employ a
mechanical apportionment rule. For example, the parties
may be concerned with protecting their respective interests
in fixed investments, or providing correct incentives for fu-
ture behavior, and these concerns may overcome the prefer-
ence for certainty. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize
the considerable value of a mechanical apportionment rule
both when designing and interpreting condemnation
clauses. 60
How, then, should the initial lease allocate the award?
We will consider four different cases: (1) condemnation of a
standard space lease in which the tenant has made no invest-
ment in the property beyond removable trade fixtures; (2)
condemnation of the leasehold where the tenant has con-
structed permanent improvements; (3) a partial taking of the
leasehold interest; and (4) a temporary taking of the lease-
hold interest.
1. The Standard Space Lease
In the space lease, the value of the landlord's interest is
the capitalized value of the contract rent plus the reversion,
i.e., the capitalized value of the stream of rents that will be
earned after the termination of the lease term. The tenant's
interest is the bonus value-the capitalized value of the dif-
ference between the market rental value and the contract
rent. Ex post, the contract rent may turn out to be a terrific
bargain so there is a large positive bonus value; alternatively,
it may turn out to be a great disaster so there is a large nega-
tive value. But, as long as there is no systematic bias when
the parties enter into the lease, the expected value of the
bonus will be zero. The expected bonus value of litigated
leases will not be zero, of course. Tenants with a negative
leasehold or no bonus value have no incentive to litigate.
59. See 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.07[5] -
[7] (3d. ed 1984) for examples of such clauses.
60. For some general reflections on the function of mechanical entitlement
determination rules in bargaining, see Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of
Determining Property Rights, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985). For example, the use of
precise lines to delineate the boundaries of private property facilitates the transfer
of property by lowering the costs of determining what is being bought and sold
and of enforcing the bargain when subsequent disputes arise.
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The only cases that will make it to court are ones in which
tenants believe that there is a large positive bonus. 61
As previously noted, the established default rule awards
the bonus value to the tenant. 62 This is equivalent to tying
the leasehold to the purchase of a lottery ticket. The prize is
the possibility that the bonus value at the time of condemna-
tion will turn out to be positive and large. The implicit price
of the ticket will reflect two factors. First, since the landlord
is not compensated for the value of a negative leasehold, but
the tenant is compensated for the value of a positive lease-
hold, the contract rent will have to be greater to reflect this
asymmetry. Second, the costs of litigation to determine the
value of the bonus will be borne, in part, by the tenant. It is
conceivable that if the leasehold and the lottery ticket were
unbundled, some tenants would still want to enter the lot-
tery. Nevertheless, given the low odds and uncertain return,
and the high costs likely to be incurred in collecting the
prize (because of strategic behavior), it is unlikely that the
tenant will find this an appealing investment.
Not only is the bonus lottery unlikely to have much ap-
peal for the tenant, there are affirmative reasons for transfer-
ring the bonus to the landlord. Ex ante, the parties will
maximize the size of any future condemnation award if they
appoint one person to represent their interests in litigation
(or settlement negotiations) with the government. A single
agent avoids the need for duplicate representation by coun-
sel, and eliminates the coordination costs that result if both
parties try simultaneously to maximize the total award from
the government and to obtain the highest division of the
award for themselves. As between the tenant and the land-
lord, the landlord would seem to be the better candidate to
serve as the agent. At the time the lease is drafted, it is virtu-
ally certain that the landlord will be involved in any future
61. A sample of leases not involved in condemnation proceedings might on
average have a positive bonus value; yet this would not necessarily be inconsistent
with the proposition that the expected value of the bonus, ex ante, would be zero.
If the probability that a leasehold will be terminated prematurely is greater for
negative than for positive bonus value leaseholds, then the pool of surviving
leaseholds would on average have a positive bonus value.
62. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); M. FRIEDMAN, Supra
note 1, § 13.3, at 504.4; 7A P. ROHAN & M. RISKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 11.03, at 11-6; 5A THOMPSON ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2583, at 255 (5th ed.
1978).
1987] 1111
UCLA LA W REVIEW
condemnation proceedings, because his interest in the
stream of rental payments and in the reversion will always
have some positive value. But it is a matter of chance
whether the tenant will be involved, because we do not know
ex ante whether the bonus value will be positive or negative.
By transferring the bonus to the landlord, the parties can
ensure that a single agent will be able to pursue the value of
an unencumbered fee simple and will thereby maximize the
size of the net total award. Recognizing this, it would be
rational for the parties to agree ex ante to transfer the bonus
(if any) to the landlord, in return for some offsetting conces-
sion to the tenant, such as a small reduction in rent (whether
explicitly bargained for or not).
2. Permanent Improvements
If the tenant plans to construct permanent improve-
ments on the leased property, drafting a condemnation
clause is more difficult. Some of these problems will be con-
sidered in the discussion of Almota in Part IV. There, a lease
clause that gave the tenant the right to remove its perma-
nent improvements prior to the expiration of the lease
raised problems involving both the total magnitude of the
taking and the apportionment of the shares. Here our con-
cern is entirely with the apportionment question.63
The default rule is that the tenant is "entitled to recover
for the buildings and fixtures to the extent that they add to
the rental value of the unexpired term."64 The theory un-
derlying the rule is that buildings and fixtures installed by
the tenant are "personal property" during the term of the
lease, but become part of the "real property" when the lease
comes to an end.65 Thus, insofar as the buildings and fix-
tures increase the fair market value of the leasehold-what
the tenant could obtain through subletting or assigning the
lease-the tenant is entitled to this increment of value. The
landlord is, however, entitled to the increment of value by
63. We ignore the practical problems of distinguishing between improve-
ments that are fixtures treated as part of the realty and movable chattels which are
not. For purposes of analysis, all improvements are assumed to be fixtures.
64. 4J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.121][2], at
13-69 (3d ed. 1985)
65. Id.
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which the buildings and fixtures enhance the value of the
landlord's reversionary interest.
The rule is an invitation to throw away money. The par-
ties must determine at the time of the condemnation the
value of the land absent the tenant's improvements and the
value of the land as improved, then subtract the former from
the latter in order to determine the increment in market
value attributable to the improvements; further, they must
determine an appropriate depreciation formula and dis-
count rate in order to allocate this increment between the
leasehold and reversionary interests. Additionally, they
must decide whether capital gains or losses associated with
the improvements accrue to the landlord or the tenant.
These determinations will add considerably to the cost of
awarding compensation under the rule.
If the tenant plans to install permanent improvements,
the lease usually includes a condemnation clause that alters
the default rule. A clause that gives 100% of the award to
the landlord would still minimize strategic behavior and
would permit the parties to maximize the value of the net
total award. But there are several reasons why the parties
will probably not agree to such a pro-landlord provision in
these circumstances.
First, unlike the bonus, the expected value of tenant im-
provements is positive, not zero. This value is, approxi-
mately, the undepreciated value of the improvements in
place at the time of the taking less their scrap value if re-
moved. 66 The tenant will clearly insist on being compen-
sated for these improvements one way or another.
Compensation could occur ex ante in the form of reduced
rent, as it typically does with respect to bonus value. Or it
could occur ex post by adopting a formula giving the tenant
some share of the condemnation award attributable to
improvements.
Negotiation of ex ante compensation would present a
number of stumbling blocks in these circumstances. First,
the parties would have to agree on the original value of the
improvements (which typically have not yet been con-
structed), an appropriate depreciation schedule, and an ac-
66. The tenant would not install the improvements initially if he did not ex-
pect to make at least a normal rate of return on the investment.
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counting method for capital gains and losses, among other
issues. Second, they would have to agree on the probability
of condemnation, when it would occur, and whether it would
be full, partial, or temporary-all of which would be sheer
guesswork. The high level of uncertainty would make it ex-
tremely difficult to agree on a number. By comparison, it
would be much easier to agree on a formula that would ap-
portion the value of tenant improvements ex post.6 7
Second, the tenant will often find it necessary or desira-
ble to borrow in order to construct buildings or improve-
ments. The mortgagee is likely to insist upon protection of
its security interest in the improvements through the draft-
ing of an appropriate condemnation clause, rather than ac-
cepting the position of an unsecured creditor in the event of
a condemnation. 68
Third, when major improvements are involved, both
parties will be concerned with decisions made by the other
party during the term of the lease. Allocating 100% of the
value of improvements to either party could destroy the
post-formation incentives of the other to cooperate. To be
sure, such distortion is not likely to be large since the
probability of condemnation is not high. But if the tenant is
to construct (and maintain) major improvements during the
term of the lease, his behavior may be influenced by know-
ing that all the value added by the improvements would go
to the landlord in the event of a condemnation. This would
be of particular concern if the probability of condemnation
increases during the term of the lease.
This problem of postformation incentive can be mini-
mized by adopting a condemnation clause that apportions
the increment in value attributable to improvements be-
67. To be sure, many of these same uncertainties are present insofar as the
bonus is concerned, and yet the parties routinely agree to ex ante compensation for
the bonus. But recall that the expected value of the bonus is zero. The tenant's
right to the bonus is thus the kind of completely speculative interest that can eas-
ily be traded off for relatively more certain gains. The tenant's improvements,
however, have a positive expected value-probably a very substantial value-and
simply cannot be ignored.
68. 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.07[1], at
11-16 (3d ed. 1984), and M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 13.6, at 529, contain sev-
eral examples of condemnation clauses written to provide protection to
mortgagees.
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tween the landlord and tenant.69 Designing a formula that
accomplishes this, and yet retains a sufficiently mechanical
quality to minimize strategic behavior, can be very difficult.
The simplest rule is to pay the tenant his costs of construc-
tion less depreciation as per formula. This works best if all
the construction takes place at the beginning of the lease.
For example, the parties can award the tenant a percentage
of the original cost equal to the number of years remaining
under the lease divided by the total years under the lease.
Note that capital gains and losses in this case are similar to
the bonus in the space lease. The expected value is approxi-
mately zero.
When there is construction and tearing down of struc-
tures taking place over the entire life of the lease, the ad-
ditional uncertainty requires a more complicated
apportionment formula. In these circumstances, the parties
may opt for a clause that requires that the unencumbered
land and the structures be separately valued at the time of
condemnation. Such a solution, however, raises much of the
strategic behavior problem presented by the default rule. 70
Alternatively, they may agree to a clause that calls for arbi-
tration, a trustee, or even good faith to determine the appor-
tionment of value attributable to improvements. 71 Such
mechanisms may mitigate, but cannot eliminate, the costs of
strategic behavior.
69. Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509
(1986), argues that compensation for takings induces people to overinvest; if they
are assured of compensation, they will have an incentive to be careless, to put
capital improvements in places where they do not belong. We need not get in-
volved here in a debate over this question. We are only comparing the relative
incentive to invest in capital improvements depending on the presence or absence
of compensation. Ceteris paribus, there will be a greater incentive to invest if there
is compensation, and the parties may decide ex ante that they want the deci-
sionmaker to have an incentive to invest.
70. Cf. Pennsylvania Ave. Dev. Corp. v. One Parcel of Land, 670 F.2d 289
(D.C. Cir. 1981), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 87-94.
71. Id. at 296 (arbitration clause); Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 378, 383, 192 N.E.2d 607, 610 (1963) ("fair and equita-
ble" division); 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 11.07[11], at 11-16 (3d ed. 1984) (arbitration clause); 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note
1, § 13.6, at 546 (arbitration clause). Alternatively, the parties could provide for
an independent appraiser to assemble the data and render a decision, thereby
eliminating the representation costs which will still be incurred in an arbitration
proceeding.
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Thus when tenant improvements are substantial and
continue over the term of the lease, the parties may be faced
with an unhappy choice between a simple allocation formula
that may not accurately reflect the values of their respective
inputs, or a more accurate method of apportionment that in-
troduces the potential for strategic behavior.
3. Partial Takings
Partial takings are much more common than total tak-
ings, and give rise to serious difficulties because the impact
of the taking is almost impossible to predict in advance. A
taking that shaves off one or two feet of frontage for a street
widening may have no impact; a taking that deprives the ten-
ant of all off-street parking may destroy the entire value of
the lease.
To complicate matters, the default rules are especially
unsatisfactory in this area. Although a total taking will ter-
minate the lease, the case law is very unclear about how ex-
tensive a partial taking must be in order to terminate a
lease.72 If the lease does not terminate, the majority rule is
that the tenant must continue to pay the full contract rent,
but is entitled to a lump sum award from the government
reflecting the discounted loss in the value of the leasehold
caused by the taking. The minority rule is that the rent will
be reduced to reflect the loss in the value of the leasehold. 73
In either case, the landlord is entitled to compensation for
damage to his reversionary interest.
The majority rule presents valuation difficulties because
of the need to determine the damage to tenant's interest,
select a discount rate, and so forth. It also increases the risk
of tenant default. If the tenant has received a lump sum
award and yet remains liable for full contract rent at a time
when the lease is worth much less than the contract rent,
there is obviously an incentive for the tenant to walk away.74
72. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 13.201, at 629. See, e.g., Saugus Auto The-
atre Corp. v. Munroe Realty Corp., 366 Mass. 310, 318 N.E.2d 615 (1974) (Com-
monwealth took land comprising fifteen percent of leased area operated as a
drive-in theater; the trial court found this was not substantial enough to terminate
lease; the court of appeals reversed and held that it was; supreme judicial court
reversed and held that it was not).
73. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 494.
74. A few courts have responded to this concern by ordering the lump sum
payment placed in trust. See id. § 13.201, at 496 (citing Stubbings v. Village of
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The minority rule reduces the risk of default, but still en-
courages strategic behavior because of the necessarily im-
precise process of determining how much the leasehold is
"really worth" after the partial taking.
Where a standard space lease is involved, the parties
will often modify the relevant default rule by giving either
the tenant, the landlord, or both the option to terminate
upon a partial taking. Thus, if the tenant finds that the lease
has been materially impaired, he can terminate, and can
either negotiate a new lease with the landlord or relocate
elsewhere. Similarly, if the landlord finds that the taking
creates too great a danger of default, the landlord can termi-
nate. The option to terminate here functions somewhat like
the threat of partition in a joint tenancy. It is the Sword of
Damocles that induces a renegotiation of terms in light of
the new realities. The opportunity for strategic behavior is
limited by the knowledge that if either side presses its advan-
tage too far, the other will simply exit from the relationship.
When more is involved than a standard space lease,
however, the option to terminate may create incentives for
strategic behavior. For example, if the tenant has con-
structed significant improvements or would incur substantial
consequential damages upon early termination, the landlord
could threaten to invoke the option in the event of a minor
taking, thereby exploiting the tenant's vulnerability in order
to secure favorable concessions. Alternatively, if the land-
lord has incurred significant costs in customizing the prop-
erty for a particular tenant, the tenant could threaten to
terminate in the event of a minor taking in order to secure
concessions from the landlord.
When the option to terminate could give rise to strate-
gic behavior, there are several possible solutions to the par-
tial takings problem, none of which is completely
satisfactory. One is to adopt a mechanical formula that
reduces the rent in the event of a partial taking (e.g., in pro-
portion to the number of square feet that have been taken).
Unless the lease property is relatively homogeneous, how-
ever, this approach will not accurately reflect the diminution
Evanston, 136 Ill. 37, 43-44, 26 N.E. 577, 578 (1891)); Pierson v. H.R. Leonard
Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 524-25, 256 N.W. 529, 535 (1934). A few states
have statutes that protect the landlord by placing the award in trust. See MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 79, § 24 (1969).
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in value. Alternatively, the parties may agree to add lan-
guage to the lease requiring that an option to terminate be
exercised only when it is "reasonable" to do so. This solu-
tion, however, could give rise to yet another layer of strate-
gic behavior, in the form of disputes over what is
"reasonable." Finally, the parties may agree to a provision
that allocates all or part of the condemnation award to re-
store any improvements that have been taken.7 5 This last
possibility, however, raises many of the problems associated
with cost-plus contracts, especially if the tenant is to do the
restoration. 76 The tenant will have an incentive to spend
generously and assign various costs to restoration in order
to increase his share of the pie.
Clearly, there is no ideal solution to the problem of par-
tial takings, especially when the tenant has made significant
improvements. It is significant, however, that even with all
the difficulties of condemnation clauses in this area, the par-
ties generally prefer to deal with the problem ex ante, by con-
demnation clauses, rather than subject themselves to default
rules that have a high potential for strategic behavior.
4. Temporary Takings
Temporary takings, for example government condem-
nation of a leased warehouse during wartime, present some
of the same problems as partial takings, but there are inter-
esting twists. Uncertainty about the scope of the taking is
still the primary concern. Here, however, there is uncer-
tainty about the duration of the taking, not its physical
dimensions.
The default rule treats the temporary taking like a com-
pulsory sublease imposed on the tenant by the government.
The tenant remains liable to the landlord for the contract
rent throughout the period of the temporary taking. 77 The
tenant is then awarded the fair market value of the leasehold
for the term of the temporary taking, discounted to present
75. 7A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 11.03[3]-[10],
at 11-17-11-36 (3d ed. 1984).
76. If the landlord has installed improvements and is to do the restoration,
there might be an incentive to underspend. Although this would reduce the value
of the landlord's reversion, the reversion may be a long way off, and might be
little affected by current expenditures on improvements.
77. 2 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 13.202, at 637.
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value and paid in a lump sum. If the temporary taking goes
on beyond the term of the primary lease, then the tenant is
off the hook altogether. In addition, under the decisions in
General Motors and Kimball Laundry,78 the tenant subject to a
temporary taking, unlike all other condemnees, is entitled to
compensation for certain consequential damages, such as
the costs of relocation and storage expense, and any de-
struction of the going concern value of its business.
Because the default rule keeps the primary landlord-
tenant relationship intact, strategic behavior is a lesser prob-
lem here. From the tenant's perspective, the main problems
relate to the difficulty of finding substitute facilities, com-
pounded by uncertainty over the duration of the govern-
ment's occupation. Temporary takings, even if originally for
less than the term of the primary lease, are often subject to
renewal. Thus, the primary tenant may have to remove his
trade fixtures and inventory to a new location, and move
back again if the government does not renew. In the
meantime, it may be quite difficult to find substitute facilities
with a sufficiently flexible term to allow the tenant to resume
his prior lease if the government elects not to renew.
If the primary lease is a standard space lease, the usual
response to these difficulties is a condemnation clause that
simply terminates the lease in the event of a temporary tak-
ing. The expected bonus value is zero, and for the reasons
previously discussed, the tenant will agree ex ante to transfer
the bonus to the landlord. Termination also eliminates the
tenant's conundrum about the need to find substitute
quarters while he awaits the government's pleasure.
When the primary lease involves substantial tenant im-
provements, the default rule, which treats the taking like a
compulsory sublease to the government, is preferable to ter-
mination. Note that here, unlike in other situations involv-
ing tenant improvements, the landlord and tenant will not
need to haggle over the apportionment of their respective
interests in the improvements. The tenant will presumably
be compensated for the value added by his improvements
during the occupation of the government, because the gov-
ernment pays for the fair market value of the leasehold.
78. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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When the tenant returns he can then enjoy the remaining
value of the improvements, just as if the lease had not been
interrupted. If the temporary taking is extended to include
the full length of the original lease term, then the tenant is
no worse off than he would have been under the original
lease, and the market value formula should have provided
him with a fully amortized recovery of the value of the
improvements.
C. The Judicial Response to Condemnation Clauses
The appropriate place to begin in considering the
courts' treatment of condemnation clauses is United States v.
Petty Motor Co. 79 At issue in that case were several con-
demned leases, one of which included a lease clause that
provided:
If the whole or any part of the demised premises shall be
taken by Federal, State, county, city, or other authority
for public use, or under any statute, or by right of emi-
nent domain, then when possession shall be taken there-
under of said premises, or any part thereof, the term
hereby granted and all rights of the tenant shall immedi-
ately cease and terminate, and the tenant shall not be en-
titled to any part of any award that may be made for such
taking, nor to any damages therefor except that the rent
shall be adjusted as of the date of such termination of the
Lease.8 0
The U.S. Supreme Court enforced the clause as written and
denied the tenant any recovery for bonus value. Petty Motor
is still widely cited for the proposition that the tenant can
contract away any and all right to compensation upon con-
demnation where there is a properly drafted condemnation
clause.
Although Petty Motor is still good law, courts in recent
years have been inclined to read condemnation clauses nar-
rowly and construe them against the landlord. In some in-
stances, the narrow interpretation is at least plausible; in
others, however, the court's rewriting of the lease is
unjustified.
Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine"l is an example
of the former. It involved a ninety-nine year lease which
79. 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
80. Id. at 375-76 n.4.
81. 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 N.W.2d 794 (1980).
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provided that condemnation "shall terminate the further lia-
bilities of both the landlords and tenants under this lease,"
but did not specifically state, as did the lease in Petty Motor,
that the tenant was entitled to no portion of the condemna-
tion award. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, citing the prop-
osition that the law "abhors a forfeiture unless stated in
most explicit terms, '8 2 held that this was insufficient to de-
prive the tenant of any compensation for his bonus value.
Viewed as a matter of discerning the intentions of the
parties, the result in Maxey is not necessarily wrong. The
question is: what did the parties assume the effect of con-
demnation would be in the absence of any lease provision?
The older common law rule was that the ouster of the tenant
by a third party did not qualify as a constructive eviction,
and hence did not excuse the tenant from future payment of
rent.8 3 If the parties assumed this was the default rule, then
the principal purpose of the termination clause would be to
excuse the tenant from further payments of rent upon con-
demnation. Such a clause would not necessarily imply that
the tenant was waiving any claim to a portion of the condem-
nation award based on bonus value. The modern rule is that
condemnation, at least a total condemnation, terminates the
lease and discharges the covenant to pay rent.8 4 If this was
the assumed background rule, then the inclusion of a termi-
nation clause in the lease might signal an intention to appor-
tion 100% of the condemnation award to the landlord.8 5
82. Id. at 403, 288 N.W.2d at 806.
83. See supra note 14. When the lease was drafted in 1915 there was no Wis-
consin authority on whether condemnation discharged the tenant's obligation to
pay rent. Not until 1965, in a decision involving a partial taking, did the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court observe that it was "settled in other jurisdictions" that a total
condemnation would act to terminate the lease. See Kilps v. Pawinski, 27 Wis. 2d
467, 134 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
84. See supra note 14.
85. It is possible that the parties would include such a clause only out of fear
the rule of automatic termination might again change. But it has been argued,
with some force, that against the background of the modern rule of automatic
termination, the inclusion of a termination clause signals an intent to award the
entire proceeds of condemnation to the landlord. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 3.55, at 292 (Casner ed. 1952) ("Inasmuch as the rule is that the lease
terminates upon a taking of the whole property without express provision to that
effect, the express provision is construed as being intended to deny to the lessee
any compensation for his leasehold."); M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 13.3, at 648
(discussing a case where the tenant unsuccessfully argued that since lease termi-
nated by law, clause was surplusage and did not cut off his rights).
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Given that the lease in Maxey was sixty years old, it is not
implausible that the original parties assumed (or at least
feared) the application of the early common law rule.
Moreover, we can ask if it is likely that the parties in-
tended to give the entire award to the landlord. Maxey did
not involve a simple space lease. Rather, the lease required
the tenant to construct a movie theater. Since tenants who
construct substantial improvements generally do receive a
share of the award, it seems reasonable to interpret the
clause in favor of the tenant's claim. Hence, the court could
have ruled for the tenant without invoking the maxim about
the law abhorring a forfeiture.86
Other decisions, however, can be explained only as evi-
dencing judicial hostility to the intentions of the parties.
Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corp. v. One Parcel of Land,87
illustrates how a court that begins with the proposition that a
lease should be interpreted "so as to prevent forfeiture" 88
can reach a result that is plainly contrary to the parties'
agreement. In that case, L leased land to T for a period of
up to ninety years with a fixed annual rental for the first
thirty years. T owned improvements on the land which, of
course, would revert to L upon termination of the lease.
The condemnation clause clearly distinguished between the
portion of the condemnation award attributable to the land,
and the portion attributable to the tenant's improvements.
With respect to the former, it provided unequivocally that
the leasehold would be terminated upon condemnation,
and, "[n]otwithstanding any statute or rule of law to the con-
trary, landlord shall be entitled to receive the total proceeds
of the award made in such proceeding."89 With respect to
86. A similar sort of ambiguity was present in United States v. Right to Use &
Occupy 3.38 Acres of Land, 484 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1973), where the lease pro-
vided that it would terminate upon condemnation, but the tenant would have the
right to file and prosecute its claims for damages against the condemnor. Id. at
1143. A possible explanation for this type of clause is that many states have stat-
utes providing compensation for losses, such as moving expenses, which do not
come under the constitutional standard. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 20:4-1 et seq.
(West 1987) (Relocation Assistance Act). The tenant might ask to have such a
clause included in the lease in order to foreclose a possible argument by the state
that these rights were waived when the tenant agreed to termination of the lease
upon condemnation.
87. 670 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
88. Id. at 292.
89. Id. at 295.
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the improvements, the lease provided unequivocally that the
value of the improvements would be divided according to
the fraction of the ninety year term remaining, i.e., the fur-
ther into the term, the larger the portion of the award for
improvements going to L.
Despite the explicit terms of the condemnation clause,
the court seized upon one sentence to find an "ambiguity"
that, under the presumption against forfeitures, allowed T
to recover the bonus value as well as his fractional share of
the improvements. The sentence that the court found am-
biguous committed the parties, in the event of condemna-
tion, to request that the court make a separate determination
of "the value of the Demised Premises considered as vacant
and unimproved land plus the value of the interest of the
landlord in the improvements on the land, and the value of
the tenant's leasehold estate including his interest in the Im-
provements on the other." 90 The Court found the word "in-
cluding" ambiguous. If the leasehold really terminated
upon condemnation, reasoned the court, then the tenant
would be entitled to nothing other than his share of the im-
provements, so why say "including"? Thus, because the
parties used the word "including" instead of another phrase
(such as "that is") in one sentence dealing with procedures
in a long and elaborate condemnation clause that was other-
wise completely unambiguous, the court rewrote the agree-
ment to allow T rather than L to reap the benefit of rising
real estate values. 91
The animating force behind a decision such as Penn-
sylvania Avenue Development Corp. is hard to fathom. It appears
from the decision that both L and T were real estate profes-
sionals. 92 The "elaborate" lease and the conveyancing
through a "complicated chain of title"93 were obviously ac-
complished with the advice of legal counsel. It is unlikely
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. For a persuasive critique of the canon of construction that every word in a
document must be given significance, see Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 812 (1983).
92. The landlord was the National Press Building Corporation and the tenant
was apparently a real estate investment partnership consisting of six individuals
and an entity called the S & L Management Company, Inc. 670 F.2d at 290-91.
93. Id. at 291.
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that condemnation was unanticipated.94 In these circum-
stances, it is difficult to imagine any story about unconscio-
nability or "unequal bargaining power" that would justify
fly-specking the lease in order to give the tenant a larger
share of the condemnation award.
In fact, despite general agreement that parties may ap-
portion condemnation awards ex ante in the lease, these pro-
visions are often litigated. Several commentators have
asserted that these disputes occur because the clauses tend
to be poorly drafted.9 5 A more likely explanation is the nat-
ural tendency of the tenant to seek to avoid the bargain he
made when condemnation was perceived as a remote possi-
bility. This would appear to be the only logical explanation
for disputes such as whether a clause providing for termina-
tion of the lease on "condemnation by public authorities,"
included condemnations by eminent domain. 96 The court in
this particular case, fortified by the presumption against for-
feitures, found that the clause did not include condemna-
tions by .eminent domain. This result indicates an even
stronger explanation for these conflicts: the tenants are
often successful.9 7 By construing condemnation clauses
against the landlord when there is a discrepancy between
what the tenant would normally receive under the default
rules and the amount the tenant is allocated by the lease,
courts exacerbate the potential for strategic behavior that in-
heres in the apportionment problem. Further, they increase
94. The condemned property included the National Theater Building on
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C., and was a prime site either for historic
preservation or the construction of future government office buildings. Id.
95. See, e.g., L. ORGEL, supra note 39, § 121, at 527; Broadman, Providing in the
Lease for the Event of Condemnation, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND AP-
PRAISAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION § 147, at 152 (S. Searles ed. 1969). To be
sure, some are poorly drafted. For example, in Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldgs v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 378, 383, 192 N.E.2d 607, 610 (1963),
the condemnation clause in a ninety-nine year lease stated that "any and all con-
demnation awards or judgments shall be divided fairly and equitably between the
fee simple estate and the leasehold estate."
96. Belmont Clothes, Inc. v. Pleet, 229 Md. 462, 184 A.2d 731 (1962).
97. See, e.g., Urban Renewal Agency v. Wieder's, Inc., 53 Or. App. 751, 632
P.2d 1334 (1981) (clause that terminates lease and allows tenant to recover busi-
ness losses and relocation costs from condemnor and not from landlord does not
preclude tenant from recovering bonus value); In re Condemnation by the Com-
monwealth Dep't of Transp., 38 Pa. Commw. 535, 394 A.2d 657 (1978) (termina-
tion clause ineffective to bar tenant from sharing in award notwithstanding
specific provision in lease providing for reduced rent during first two years of
tenancy in consideration of possibility of condemnation).
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the costs of ex ante apportionment by making it extremely
difficult for the parties to design efficient condemnation
clauses.
The modern cases suggest that courts do not under-
stand the primary rationale behind condemnation clauses:
elimination of costly strategic behavior that leaves both
landlord and tenant worse off. On the contrary, courts seem
to view disputes between landlords and tenants as simply a
matter of achieving after-the-fact justice. Looking back-
wards, condemnation clauses that award 100% to the land-
lord seem "unfair," and the temptation is clearly to give the
tenant something. We hope that we have shown that, on a
more rigorous analysis, there are serious shortcommings
with such an approach. Here, as elsewhere, judicial insis-
tence on viewing disputes strictly from an ex post perspec-
tive can leave other similarly situated persons worse off.98
IV. ALMOTA AND THE EXPECTATION OF RENEWAL
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States99
is the leading modern case on condemnation of leased prop-
erty. The U.S. Supreme Court held that a tenant who made
substantial improvements to condemned property was enti-
tled to compensation for the value of those improvements.
The Court further required that the probability of renewal
of the tenant's lease should be taken into account when as-
sessing the value of the improvements. 0 0 The decision in
Almota is extremely muddled, in large part because the Court
fails to indicate what question it is answering. Is the govern-
ment's total liability affected by taking the expectation of re-
newal into account in valuing the tenant's improvements?
98. See Easterbrook, Foreward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1984).
99. 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
100. In so ruling, the Court distinguished Petty Motor, a case not involving im-
provements, where it had held that a tenant is not entitled to compensation for the
mere expectation that the lease would have been renewed. See United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380 n.9 (1946) (evidence showing that landlord
and tenant had a habit of regularly renewing the lease does not expand the scope
of the tenant's compensable property right) (citing Emery v. Boston Terminal
Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 N.E. 763 (1901)); see also Riebs v. Milwaukee County
Park Comm., 252 Wis. 144, 31 N.W.2d 190 (1948) (despite testimony that land-
lord intended to allow month-to-month tenant, who had leased site for several
years, to remain at least another season, tenant's compensation limited to value of
thirty day lease).
1987] 1125
UCLA LA W REVIEW
Or is the issue of renewal relevant only to the division of the
award between the landlord and tenant? The Court's failure
to confront these questions is the source of much of the
confusion.
The facts in Almota were simple. The Almota Farmers
Elevator Company leased land from a railroad adjacent to
the tracks. It had been using the land under successive
leases since 1919. The lease authorized Almota to make im-
provements to the land, and provided that Almota could re-
move any improvements it made at any time during the life
of the lease. Almota had constructed a grain elevator and
other extensive improvements on the land. When the gov-
ernment instituted eminent domain proceedings in 1967,
Almota had a twenty-year lease with seven and one-half
years yet to run. The contract rent was a mere $114.20 per
year, and the value of the structures in place, it was stipu-
lated, was $274,625.0I After acquiring the railroad's inter-
est through a negotiated settlement, the government sought
to acquire Almota's interest by condemnation.
The government's proffered compensation was for the
use and occupancy of the buildings for the remainder of the
lease term and for the salvage value of the buildings. Since
salvage value was considerably less than the value of the im-
provements in place, Almota argued that it was entitled to
an award reflecting the value of the improvements in place
beyond the expiration of the lease term. In a five to four
opinion, the Court agreed. A buyer of the leasehold interest
in an arm's length transaction, the Court asserted, would
have been willing to pay Almota for the improvements in
place:
It seems particularly likely in this case that Almota could
have sold the leasehold at a price that would have re-
flected the continued ability of the buyer to use the im-
provements over their useful life .... In a free market,
Almota would hardly have sold the leasehold to a pur-
chaser who paid only for the facilities over the remainder
of the lease term, with Almota retaining the right ... of
salvage. 10 2
Thus, the Court held that the fair market value of Almota's
interest was something more than the capitalized value of
101. Almota, 409 U.S. 470 (Petition for Certiorari, at 3, 9).
102. 409 U.S. at 475.
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the improvements for the balance of the term plus their sal-
vage value. It was also, apparently, something less than the
full value of the assets in place, since that value would pre-
sumably have to be discounted to reflect the fact that Almota
had only an expectation, rather than a right, of renewal.
Almota raises what the leading treatise on eminent do-
main has described as "an interesting problem."' 0 3 The
problem is this: the tenant's improvements have added sub-
stantially to the value of the fee. Under the ordinary default
rule, this value would be apportioned between the landlord
and tenant, with the tenant receiving the value attributable
to the remaining lease term, and the landlord the value at-
tributable to the reversion. 0 4 Under the lease, however, the
tenant' also has the right to remove the improvements up to
the last day of the term. 10 5 Where there is such a right of
removal, courts generally hold that the landlord is not enti-
tled to any of the value attributable to improvements as part
of his reversion. 0 6 Yet if neither the landlord nor the tenant
is entitled to the value of the improvements in place beyond
103. 4J. SACKMAN & P ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.121[1], at
13-63 (3d ed. 1985).
104. See supra Part III(B)(2).
105. It would often be value-enhancing for the parties to a long-term lease to
give the tenant the unilateral power to make decisions regarding construction,
alteration, and removal of structures, subject to the proviso that no physical harm
is done to the landlord's interest. Absent such a provision, the landlord could
withhold consent for an alteration, unless the tenant agreed to compensate for
that consent. Giving control over the structures to the tenant reduces the poten-
tial costs that would arise from the landlord's strategic behavior. These benefits
are offset in part by an increased incidence of strategic behavior by the tenant at
the time of lease renegotiation. But the parties can often structure the lease so as
to dampen the tenant's incentives to play games. For example, in Helvering v.
Bruun, 309 U.S. 461,464 (1940), a ninety-nine year lease prohibited tearing down
any building in the last three and one-half years of the term.
106. This result does not inevitably follow. One could argue that unless the
tenant actually removes the improvements, the mere right to remove will not de-
feat the landlord's claim to a property interest in the improvements as part of his
reversion. The general rule, however, in Washington and elsewhere, is that the
landlord is not entitled to compensation for fixtures, structures, or other improve-
ments where the lease gives the tenant the right to remove improvements. See
Seattle & Mont. Ry., v. Scheike, 3 Wash. 625, 29 P. 217 (1892); State v. Obie
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 943, 516 P.2d 233 (1973); Annotation,
17 A.L.R.4th 337, 398 (1982); see also In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 753
F.2d 56, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (grain elevator holds over after end of lease, fair
rental value determined on basis of value of unimproved land because tenant had
right to remove improvements).
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the end of the lease term, then what happens to this incre-
ment in value? As Nichols puts it:
If the condemnor has to pay the whole additional value of
the real estate due to the existence of the buildings and
fixtures, either the landlord or the tenant will receive
more than his interest is actually worth. Whether this is
one of the cases in which the value of the real estate as
such is disregarded and the total value of the separate
interests in the real estate is the proper measure of com-
pensation is not yet entirely clear. 107
The Almota "problem" disappears, however, if we distin-
guish carefully between the total size of the award and the
apportionment of the award between the landlord and ten-
ant. The fact that the tenant can remove the structures does
not mean that the total award should be less than the value
of an undivided fee simple. This is simply another instance
of our point in Part II that paper encumbrances which re-
duce the value of the property ex post should be ignored. If
the parties had considered the impact of the right to remove
improvements on condemnation value when they negotiated
the lease, they would have included a clause terminating this
right upon condemnation. Such a provision would maxi-
mize the net total value of the condemnation award.108 The
same result is achieved, of course, by applying the undivided
fee rule.
Thus, it is not correct, as Nichols suggests, that applica-
tion of the undivided fee rule in this context means that
"either the landlord or the tenant will receive more than his
interest is actually worth." The total award should be based
on the highest and best use of the property, which includes
the value of the structures in place. There is no "windfall"
involved in such an award, because the parties could have
costlessly realized such a value through the proper lease
agreement, i.e., an agreement that the tenant's right to re-
move would terminate upon condemnation. Indeed, they
could achieve such a result in other ways as well: the tenant
107. 4J. SACKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.12 1[1], at
13-63 (3d ed. 1985).
108. The government conceded this point at trial. The Court (to government
lawyer): "[If on the day before the condemnation action was filed ... the Almota
Company had conveyed this property to the railroad company, you would be pay-
ing them about five times as much as you are offering them now. Mr. Mcrae: Yes,
your honor." Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409
U.S. 470 (1973) (Petition for Certiorari, at 87).
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could agree to sell the improvements to the landlord; the
landlord could agree to sell the reversion to the tenant; or
both could agree to sell their respective interests to a third
party, who would then hold the undivided fee. The point is
that the separate rights of the parties, in the right combina-
tion, are necessarily worth the value of the undivided fee.
Consequently, the parties should be compensated for the
value of an undivided fee.
Given that the property should be valued as an undi-
vided fee simple, how should the award be apportioned? As
should be clear from our prior discussion, the default rule
does not really matter as long as the parties are free to mod-
ify it by prior negotiation. The simplest default rule here,
perhaps, would be to award the tenant the difference between
the value of the undivided fee as improved and the value of
the land as unimproved. In effect, the tenant would be enti-
tled to the value of the improvements in place as if the lease
would be perpetually renewed. Using such an approach,
there would be no need to value the "expectation" of re-
newal or to discount the value of the improvements in place
for the probability of nonrenewal. Should the parties find
that this apportionment is overly generous to the tenant or
otherwise inappropriate, they could simply draft a condem-
nation clause to apportion the value attributable to the im-
provements in a different way.
Under the framework of analysis proposed by this pa-
per, the Almota problem is easy. Why then did the Supreme
Court find it necessary to create a new right to compensation
for the expectation of renewal? The basic problem was that
the Court failed to perceive the distinction between the size
of the pie and the division of the pie. The reason it failed to
make this distinction was probably because the landlord, the
railroad, was not a party to the case. The issue therefore was
regarded by both the litigants and the Court as a simple two-
party dispute between the tenant and the government, with
the prior settlement with the railroad treated as
irrelevant. ' 09
109. It is not at all clear, however, that the ultimate payor of Almota's compen-
sation would be the government. By finding that Almota has a right to compensa-
tion, the Court does not preclude a finding that the government might have a
subsequent action against the railroad to indemnify it for its payment to Almota.
In a similar case where the tenant was not a party to the transaction between the
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Since the railroad's compensation was determined by
negotiation, the obvious question is: how much did it re-
ceive and on what was this award based? The Court did not
say. ' l0 The record strongly intimates that the railroad re-
ceived comparatively little in the way of compensation.'
Given the established rule that the landlord is not compen-
sated for the value of improvements when the tenant has a
right to remove, the railroad was probably compensated for
the capitalized value of the future stream of rental pay-
ments-which was low-and for its reversionary interest in
the unimproved land. If this is correct, then the government
was in the position of arguing that it did not have to pay
anything for the value of the improvements in place after the
end of the lease term. It is not implausible that the Court
instinctively recoiled from this argument. As Justice Powell
observed in his concurring opinion: "It would be unjust to
allow the Government to use 'salami' tactics to reduce the
amount of one property owner's compensation by first ac-
quiring an adjoining piece of property or another interest in
the same property from another property owner."'"l 2 The
Court's instincts were sound, but its solution was unfortu-
nate. Essentially, the Court responded to a perceived inade-
quacy in the total compensation by adjusting the apportionment
rules.
government and the landlord, the court noted: "It is immaterial to the present
case whether the lessee could recover from the lessor a share of the amount paid
to the lessor by the city, or whether the city can now recover from the lessor the
amount of any overpayment." Universal Container Corp. v. City of Cambridge,
361 Mass. 58, 61, 278 N.E.2d 727, 729 (1972).
110. To be sure, the Court did not receive any help from the litigants. The
court of appeals noted in its opinion:
Prior to the commencement of the condemnation action here under
review, the United States had settled with the fee owner, the Rail-
road, for the railroad's interest in the land here in question. We are
not advised as to the terms of that settlement. Neither party to this
case urges that those terms would be relevant in this case.
Almota, 450 F.2d 125, 126 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 470 (1973). Similarly, in
the Briefs to the Supreme Court, neither side felt it necessary to apprise the Court
of the terms of the award.
111. We base this on the inference that if the government had fully compen-
sated the railroad for the reversion, the government lawyers would have stressed
the point in the subsequent litigation with Almota, contending that it should not
be forced to pay twice.
112. 409 U.S. at 480 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The new default rule created by Almota is subject to crit-
icism on a number of grounds. First, although the problem
that gave rise to Almota is the tenant's unilateral right to re-
move improvements, the Court's new rule is stated broadly,
and apparently applies to all cases involving tenant improve-
ments. Second, by saying that the tenant is entitled to have
his expectation of renewal considered in valuing improve-
ments, the Court called into question the general rule that
the tenant is not entitled to compensation for any expecta-
tion of renewal. This uncertainty has already led to addi-
tional litigation." 13 Finally, as Justice Rehnquist emphasized
in his dissent, valuation of the tenant's expectancy will create
considerable difficulty. For example, should a one year ten-
ant be given some compensation for the (slight) probability
of a fifty year occupancy?' 1 4 The new default rule therefore
increases the administrative costs of eminent domain pro-
ceedings, and gives further impetus to strategic behavior.
All of these problems could have been avoided simply by ap-
plying the undivided fee rule and a fairly conventional ap-
portionment rule.
Although Almota itself could have been resolved by a
routine application of the undivided fee rule, the facts of the
case suggest another issue concerning the division of the
award-one that could in fact have an indirect effect on the
magnitude of the award. If the landlord (or the tenant)
reaches a separate agreement with the government, is it pos-
sible for that party to devise a settlement that increases the
amount it receives while at the same time decreasing the
amount the government must pay? That is, given the rules
for sharing the award, is it possible for the government and
the landlord (or the government and the tenant) to improve
their respective lots at the expense of the nonsettling party?
Suppose, for example, that instead of simply taking the
land as it did in Almota, the government induced the railroad
to relocate its tracks, rendering the improvements useless
113. See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); United
States v. 57.09 Acres of Land, 757 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Weyerhauser Co., 538 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976);
Rowland v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 267 (1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 92 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
114. Almota, 409 U.S. at 485 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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save for their salvage value.' " 5 The opportunity for both the
government and the landlord to profit at the expense of the
tenant would be considerable in this case, since the tenant
would lose his interest in the structures in place for the dura-
tion of the remaining lease period.
If it were possible to prevent this kind of opportunistic
behavior costlessly, the initial lease would do so. Preventing
such behavior would increase the expected size of the total
award, and, by sharing the gains, both parties could be bet-
ter off. Prevention of opportunistic behavior is not, how-
ever, without cost. Thus, we face the familiar question of
what are the benefits and costs of policing this behavior?
We also face the related question of who should decide.
That is, should the balancing be a matter to be determined
by the parties in their lease? Should the courts determine
only default rules that can be replaced by private agree-
ment? Should the courts impose a duty of good faith on the
landlord and/or the government?
We need not resolve these questions here. The impor-
tant point is that the question of whether the expectation of
renewal is a compensable interest is a red herring."16 The
crucial question is whether it is possible for the landlord and
condemnor to profit at the expense of the tenant. If it is,
then we can raise such issues as the ability of tenants to pro-
tect themselves ex ante, and the good faith of the landlord
and condemnor. The tenant's expectation of renewal could
conceivably be evidence on those issues, but it would not
itself be regarded as a compensable property right.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER PROPERTY RIGHTS
SUBJECT TO CONDEMNATION
Genuinely difficult conceptual problems arise when the
government condemns leased property. Courts can go a
long way toward resolving these problems, however, if they
keep two things in mind. First, the sum of the parts should
always equal the value of an undivided fee simple. Second,
115. For a case in which this was the alleged strategy of the government, see
United States v. 12.18 Acres of Land, 623 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1980).
116. In two cases that raise this question,Jefferson County, 623 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1980), and Western Robidoux Printing & Lithographing Co. v. Missouri State
Highway Comm'n, 498 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1973), the courts center the analysis on
whether the tenant's expectancy of renewal is compensable.
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in dividing up the total award, condemnation clauses should
be favored rather than discouraged. Both of these proposi-
tions reflect what is, in effect, hornbook law. But the failure
to understand the rationale behind these propositions has
often led courts into equivocation and confusion. The un-
certainty created by this state of affairs has probably in-
creased the incidence of strategic behavior that occurs when
the government condemns property encumbered with a
lease.
The analysis of the impact of condemnation on land-
lord-tenant relations may also provide some lessons for
other areas of eminent domain. Two areas in particular may
be worth reconsideration: condemnation of future interests
and condemnation of contractual rights.
In the future interests area, the problem usually arises
when the government takes land which has been transferred
for some charitable or public purpose and is held subject to
a possibility of reverter or right of entry in the heirs of the
grantor. The facts of Ink v. City of Canton " 7 are typical. In
Ink, land was given to the City to be used as a public park,
with a reversionary interest in the grantors' heirs should the
land cease to be used as a public park. Years later, the state
condemned most of the land for a highway. In such cases,
courts seem to have no trouble applying the undivided fee
rule, perhaps because the grantee's interest is called a "de-
feasible fee." They are divided, however, about the appro-
priate rule of apportionment. A majority hold that the
grantee is entitled to 100% of the proceeds of the condem-
nation. A minority hold that the heirs of the grantor are en-
titled to 100% of the condemnation. In the Ink case, the
court rejected both of these rules, and decreed that the
award should be apportioned between the parties in accord-
ance with the fair market values of their respective
interests.' 18
The Ink approach is an invitation to disaster. It is ex-
tremely difficult to develop the fair market value of a defeasi-
ble fee, and even more difficult to develop the fair market
value of the heirs' possibility of reverter. There is little or
no secondary market for either interest to which we can look
117. 4 Ohio St. 2d 51, 212 N.E.2d 574 (1965).
118. Id. at 60, 212 N.E.2d at 579.
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for comparable prices. Moreover, the possibility of reverter,
and perhaps also the defeasible fee, will yield no cash flow
that can be capitalized to produce a value. Ink's apportion-
ment rule would therefore lead to extensive strategic
behavior.
In addition, Ink erroneously assumes that the ex post fair
market value of the parts will add up to the market value of a
fee simple. This assumption is wrong for two reasons. First,
the restriction or use imposed by the grantor will probably
reduce the market value of the property. For the original
grantor, the subjective value attached to the creation of a
public park bearing his name will equal or exceed the value
of the property in any other use. But the ex post valuation of
such a restriction by the market will probably be otherwise
reflected in the ex post valuation of the market. Second, a
deep discount will be required because of the virtually non-
existent secondary market for both of these peculiar inter-
ests. This does not mean that the undivided fee rule is
wrong. As explained in Part II(B), paper encumbrances that
reduce value ex post should be ignored, and the undivided fee
rule accomplishes this. But a court that assumes that the
value of the undivided fee can be apportioned by determin-
ing the ex post market value of the individual interests will be
led into a mass of confusion, as was the Ink court. '19
The ideal solution, as in the case of leases, would be to
establish apportionment by condemnation clause. Unfortu-
nately, condemnation clauses are rarely, if ever, encountered
in this area, probably because an attempt by the grantor to
dictate the distribution of a future condemnation award
119. A court that understood this could continue to apply the undivided fee
rule, and yet try to apportion the award by valuing one interest separately, and
giving the balance to the second party. But the fair market value of either interest
considered separately will be very small. The value of the City's interest would
depend on whether there is a secondary market for private parks. (There will not
be a secondary market for public parks-i.e., those that do not charge admission.
If the grant requires that the park be open to the public without charge, then the
market value is probably zero.) And the heirs' interest is analogous to a lottery
ticket that requires relatively high monitoring costs to determine whether there
has been a payoff. Given that each interest, by itself, will have a fairly low value,
the critical question would be which of the two interests should be valued first.
General considerations of "fairness" invoked by the Ink court can no more answer
this question than they can tell us which of the two parties should get 100%.
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would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.12 0 Barred from
using a condemnation clause, the grantor's second prefer-
ence, we think, would in most cases be to give the proceeds
to the grantee. This is because the primary purpose of the
gift over to the heirs is not to benefit the heirs, but to pro-
vide a "penalty" to enforce compliance with the original
grant. Moreover, it would be administratively difficult to lo-
cate the heirs years or even decades after the original grant;
if they could be located, they might engage in strategic be-
havior contesting their respective shares. Finally, the pos-
thumous gift over could entail unexpected tax consequences
for the grantor's estate. Thus, in the imperfect world of fu-
ture interests where condemnation clauses are not available,
the majority rule awarding 100% of the condemnation pro-
ceeds to the grantee is probably the correct default rule.
Note, too, that the majority rule is similar to what one
finds in landlord-tenant condemnation clauses with respect
to bonus value. Here, too, the ex ante value of the heirs' in-
terest, like the tenant's bonus, is zero, or at least close to
zero. Thus, based on the pattern of responses in the land-
lord tenant area, we would expect to find that the heirs' ex-
pectancy is not the kind of interest that the grantor would be
anxious to protect in the event of condemnation.
The government rarely condemns contractual rights,
but when it does, the same kind of triangular pattern of rela-
tionships exists as in the landlord-tenant context. In Omnia
Co. v. United States,' 21 for example, the government requisi-
tioned a large quantity of steel plate from Allegheny, which
had been under contract to deliver the steel at below-market
prices to Omnia. Omnia sued the United States in the Court
of Claims, contending that the government had taken its
contractual rights without paying just compensation. The
Supreme Court denied the claim, distinguishing between a
case in which the government appropriates a contract-
where the Court said compensation would be required-and
a case in which the government merely frustrates a contract
120. The argument would be that the grantor is attempting to create an execu-
tory interest that would not necessarily vest within any life in being plus twenty-
one years. The interest of the heirs is not itself subject to the Rule because of the
historical quirk that exempts possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from the
Rule.
121. 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
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or makes performance of a contract impossible-where the
Court said compensation is not required.
Omnia has been criticized for elevating form over sub-
stance. The buyer under the original contract (Omnia) lost
a valuable right-the benefit of its bargain with the seller-
no matter how the government's action is characterized.122
Note, however, the close parallel between the buyer-seller
relationship and the tenant-landlord relationship. As long
as the government pays the seller the fair market value of
what is taken-here the steel plate-the apportionment of
the award between the parties can be handled by ex ante
agreement. Thus, Omnia could have protected itself from
the loss of the benefit of its bargain by insisting on a clause
in the original contract that would provide it with a share of
the total compensation in the event of a government requisi-
tion of the steel plate.
In fact, just as the tenant will commonly assign the bo-
nus value to the landlord, so the buyer will commonly assign
his benefit of the bargain to the seller. The chosen instru-
ment for doing so is the so called "force majeure" clause,
which excuses the seller from further performance in the
event of certain contingencies, including, typically, a govern-
ment taking.1 23 The reasons why the buyer would agree to a
force majeure clause are similar to those that support trans-
fer of the bonus to the landlord. Ex ante, the benefit of the
bargain is zero, and the parties have much to gain, should
the government interfere with the contract, by eliminating
strategic behavior and sidebar arguments over apportion-
ment. The buyer can be compensated for giving up his
rights by offsetting concessions from the seller, such as a
modest reduction in the price, whether or not this is bar-
gained for explicitly. 124
122. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, supra note 16, at 92-94.
123. In Omnia, the seller specified in his offer that "all agreements [are] contin-
gent upon strikes, accidents, or other causes beyond our control." Record at 7,
Omnia Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
124. The complete story in Omnia is slightly more complicated. The steel
plates contract between Omnia and Allegheny appears to have been deliberately
set at a price below market in order to compensate Omnia for the transfer of
certain machinery and mill equipment to Allegheny that Omnia could not use,
given a war-induced shortage of labor and materials. Petitioner's Brief, at 1,
Omnia, 261 U.S. 502. Thus, the expected value of Omnia's contract was positive,
not zero, making the case more analogous to one of permanent tenant improve-
ments than to the bonus. Nevertheless, the basic point remains sound. Omnia
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In short, Omnia was correctly decided, but for the wrong
reasons. The government need not compensate the buyer
when it takes the subject matter of the contract. The reason
for this is not, however, because it is important to differenti-
ate between "appropriations" and mere "interferences"
with contracts. Rather, compensation is not required be-
cause the buyer can bargain with the seller in advance of any
taking, and thus is in a position fully to protect his interests.
Indeed, the default rule in the contracts area-no compensa-
tion to the buyer-probably comports more with the inten-
tions of the parties than does the default rule in the
landlord-tenant area, where the tenant has a compensable
property right but routinely bargains it away.
Omnia suggests, once again, that it is important to re-
member the potential for ex ante bargaining whenever gov-
ernment condemnation implicates multiple parties. If courts
recognize that bargaining takes place in the shadow of emi-
nent domain, the substance of eminent domain law will be
strengthened.
could have insisted upon contractual protection in the event its contractual rights
were frustrated by a government requisition.
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